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Action in the Pacific

The American armed forces in the Pacific have been performing magnificently. The attack on Truk, which sank 19 ships and destroyed 201 planes, was a pretty good answer to Pearl Harbor. The landing on Eniwetok Island, coming so soon after the attack on Kwajalein, indicates an astonishingly rapid tempo of action. Great vigor is also being shown in the New Guinea and New Britain campaigns. The changes in the Japanese cabinet no doubt reflect the dismay the Japanese are feeling. Some estimates indicate they have only about a quarter of the shipping they need, and even this is being whittled down, as American submarines operate deep in Japanese imperial waters. The timetable of the war still calls for the defeat of Germany first; but the rapid progress in the Pacific is encouraging, and especially in view of the dishearteningly slow advance in Italy.

Congress Makes Its Bed

Congress, which is jealous of its powers and wants to assert its place in the government as against executive action, keeps on doing almost everything possible to demonstrate its unfitness to govern. It holds up any good plan to allow soldiers to vote; it tries to boost the cost of living by voting against food subsidies; it fails to tax adequately, while it passes tax bills so complex as to burden the lives of the taxpayers.

Two forces, outside of poor congressional organization, largely account for this consistent wrong-headedness. One is the fact that Congress is more influenced by pressure groups and local demands than by the welfare of the people as a whole. The other is that a

large number of its members, including most of the Republicans and some of the Democrats, are more intent on injuring the President than on winning the war or the peace. By so doing they are handing him some of the best issues that a presidential candidate ever had.

Of course the doubt remains that enough citizens will be able to distinguish between congressional and presidential responsibility when they come to vote. They may take revenge on the head of the ticket for the mess that Congress is making. There is only one way to prevent this outcome—a vigorous campaign in the congressional districts, to inform the voters and elect more Senators and Representatives who are above peanut politics.

Respecting Church Property

Frank Gervasi of Collier's Weekly says flatly that more than 700 American soldiers lost their lives because the Anglo-American Army in Italy tried so long to respect the wishes of the Pope and spare the former monastery at Mount Cassino, now (or until it was bombed) a boys' school and museum. Whether his estimate is correct it is difficult to say, but without doubt many American lives were sacrificed out of deference to the feelings of Catholics. A problem is here presented which will become more difficult as the war goes on. The Germans are completely unscrupulous; they will occupy church buildings at every opportunity in order to make trouble for the Allies. It seems to us inevitable that from military necessity, the distinction between Church and secular property must be dropped. Presumably it has been maintained thus far primarily out of deference to the Catholics in Great Britain and

CONTENTS

The Week 259

Editorials

How to Unite the World 261

The Baruch Plan 263

General Articles

A Postwar National Fiscal Program

Beardsley Ruml, George Soule, Oswald W.

Knauth and Alvin H. Hansen 265

The New Russian Enigma Irving Brant 272

Postwar Jobs in Aircraft

. Richard T. Frankenstein 274

Washington Notes T. R. B. 279

The Happiness Boys Manny Farber 280

A Communication Melville J. Herskovits 280

The Bandwagon 281

Correspondence 282

Books in Review

An Assassinated Poet Malcolm Cowley 284

Exotics Mark Schorer 286

Man from Nowhere Isaac Rosenfeld 288

In Re: Germany Heinz H. F. Eulau 290

Two New Thrillers Elizabeth Huling 294

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the United States and not elsewhere. We refuse to believe that these Catholics are willing to see the lives of many Americans sacrificed in order to respect church property that is being used by the Germans for military purposes.

State Department Censorship Again

A few days ago Geoffrey Parsons Jr., London correspondent of The New York Herald Tribune, cabled to his paper saying that the British government is now severely censoring dispatches from American newspapermen in London to this country. Mr. Parsons said that at the request of the American State Department, correspondents are prohibited from sending dispatches commenting on disagreements among the Allies on foreign policy, until such comments have appeared in the British press (which is far more cautious and well controlled than are American journals). Mr. Parsons' statement was taken up by Mr. Stettinius, Undersecretary of State, who made an indirect denial that official representations had been made by the American government to the British Foreign Office. To this The Herald Tribune retorted that these things don't need to be made official documents, and rarely are; that a mere verbal protest, or even an inquiry, is enough; that such verbal protests and inquiries have been made repeatedly. Mr. Frederick Kuh of the Marshall Field newspapers supports The Herald Tribune's position. It would seem that the next move is up to the State Department. Meanwhile, news of the sort supposedly prohibited has been conspicuously lacking in at least the New York press in recent weeks.

Closing Down the Colleges

Many American colleges were thrown into a panic when the War Department announced a few days ago that most of its contracts for special training are to be canceled at once. The number of students under the Army Specialized Training Program will be cut from 145,000 to 35,000, those who are left being almost entirely men taking advanced courses in medicine, dentistry or engineering.

Thus we add one more item to our almost unbroken record of incompetent and bungling treatment of selective service. This time it is due to the cowardice of Congress, which for political reasons long refused to draft married men and especially those with children. So far as we know, the United States is the only country in the world which make this distinction.

An earlier and even worse bungle came when we set our physical standards ridiculously high, taking nobody not considered fit for first-line service. Canada, on the contrary, has taken many with minor disabilities, thereafter giving each man the sort of duties for which he was prepared. For a long time, the United States would not even take men with easily corrected defects. We understand that the American Medical Association opposed doing so lest permitting minor operations and dental work to be done free of charge should "open the door to socialized medicine"!


The newest move is based on the army's urgent need of men, which undoubtedly is genuine. At the same time, it will create a grave shortage of badly needed technicians three or four years hence; evidently the army is gambling on a short war. As for the colleges, some of them will have to close their doors but the majority will probably manage to squeeze through, in one way or another.

Free Speech at Hunter

Dr. George N. Shuster, head of Hunter College, New York City, a few days ago issued an order to the members of the faculty. He threatened to prefer charges against them if they criticized the war, identified the papacy with fascism, indulged in anti-Semitism, praised Russia as superior to our democracy or spoke disparagingly of the Negro. On most of these points The New Republic agrees with Dr. Shuster; but we think he made a mistake in the peremptory form of the document. Members of a college faculty should not be ordered what to teach. If they are not good enough to have independent judgment of their own which the administrative officers ought to respect, they are not good enough to be on a faculty at all.

Trouble in the OWI

Elmer Davis says he hopes the OWI can be kept out of the papers in the future, and most people will agree with him that this is desirable. If the President had given him clear and undisputed authority in the first place, and had attached to the OWI the importance it deserves, most of its past troubles could have been averted. In regard to the recent dismissal of three top officers of Mr. Robert Sherwood's Overseas Branch, no outsider can comment intelligently. Those hostile to Mr. Davis say that he interfered with psychological warfare at a moment—just before the invasion—when it is of special importance. His friends reply that no harm was done to the activities and that



Drawing by M. Bernstein. Copyright, 1944, by Field Publications and reprinted by courtesy of PM.

it was virtually necessary to bring the OWI under one management, so that its head would not be held responsible for activities he did not control. In one way, as Europe itself becomes the main battlefield, the OWI's psychological warfare becomes more and more an auxiliary of the excellent work the British are doing. They can use long-wave radio and reach a far greater audience than the short-wave transmission can do. The real trouble with the OWI remains what it has been from the beginning: that President Roosevelt refrains from giving any such idealistic lead as President Wilson offered in the First World War, which proved so enormously effective as propaganda material.

That Ruml Forgiveness

When the Ruml tax plan was being debated, a number of our friends hotly protested that it would "forgive" a year's taxes. That plan was adopted, in part, and those who are now struggling with their tax blanks will find that the word "forgive" is displayed on them. But when the figuring is all over, we wish anyone who finds that the money which the government will take from him in 1944 is less than that which he paid in 1943, would let us know. And remember, in doing so, that the rates for the two years are the same. We should like to find someone who really got any "wind-fall" from the shift, in either year. If there has been no actual forgiveness, when will it come? We still don't understand.

The SEP Again

The poor old Saturday Evening Post is in trouble again. It wrote an editorial supporting the American State Department against its critics; but The SEP is several weeks on the press, and its editorial appeared just a few days after the State Department had changed its policy on every one of the points The SEP was defending. The Post says, "The campaign against the State Department is inspired by a small but implacable group which wants American foreign policy to play second fiddle to the communist 'party line'." This statement is just simply not so. The only people who want the State Department to follow the Communist Party line are the Communists, a pathetic little group of negligible people whose party line at present is in fact slavish admiration of everything Mr. Roosevelt wants and does. Many thousands of non-Communists have been urging the State Department to recognize the French Committee of National Liberation; the State Department now agrees. They have asked the Department not to cling to ex-Fascists like Badoglio and the King in Italy; the Department now tacitly admits it was wrong. They wanted a tough policy toward Franco; the tough policy started a couple of weeks ago (but after The SEP had gone to press). Perhaps The SEP is suggesting that Secretary Hull is under Communist influence, since he is now reliably

reported to be following what our Philadelphia contemporary thinks is the Community Party line!

But the Rumors Go On

For many months, anti-Semitic rumor-mongers in New York have been charging that large numbers of Jews are employed in the Brooklyn Navy Yard, where they can keep out of the army by engaging in essential industry. The charge, of course, is false; the proportion of Jewish employees at the Brooklyn Navy Yard is less than it is in the whole city. Now come charges that there is actually discrimination against both Jews and Negroes in the navy yard, made by a CIO union and by the American Jewish Congress. Will these charges, which seem pretty well substantiated, stop the anti-Semitic rumors mentioned above? Brother, if you think so you don't know what the anti-Semites are like.

How to Unite the World

NEARLY EVERYONE is agreed that nationalist isolation must be abandoned after the war, and the peoples of the world must be knit more closely together. But there is no general agreement on how this should be done. Blueprints of many kinds have been sketched, but there is none to which grave objections have not been raised. A thoughtful contribution to this vexed subject has recently been made in a pamphlet by David Mitrany, under the title, "A Working Peace System."¹ The fact that Professor Mitrany is a seasoned and brilliant political scientist rather than a newcomer to this field makes his comment worthy of special attention.

Mr. Mitrany cuts the Gordian knot in a somewhat startling way by proposing that there should be no single international government at all. This does not imply that his position is purely negative; he suggests another approach to the commonly desired goal which is capable of being followed further than many advocates of a world state would be prepared to go. But his negative criticism, which clears the ground for the action he favors, is sharp and sweeping.

The failure of the League of Nations to preserve the peace is attributed by many to the fact that it was too loose an association, with too little energy and too few powers. If we are to have anything like a real international government, it must at least assume the form of a federation. But what can be the scope and structure of such a federation?

If, as some have proposed, we have a series of federations on a regional basis, we shall have bound together states without much regard for their needs of commerce and communication, which in the modern world extend across oceans and continental boundaries,

¹ New York: Oxford University Press. 50 cents.

and often more strongly so than in their immediate neighborhoods. We shall, moreover, exaggerate the present dangers of competitive nationalism by making larger and stronger separate units, capable of embodying more deadly threats to each other. The "United States of Europe" was, in its original conception, not so very different from a German Pan-Europa.

If, on the other hand, as some have suggested, we unite those nations which have the same ideological principles, such as the democracies, we sharpen cleavages along a different line. Many nations with professedly democratic constitutions are really not democratic at all in our sense of the word. One of the problems of maintaining peace is to learn how to get along without war in a world which is certain for a long time to exhibit a good deal of variety in government and ways of thinking. For instance, if we federate on ideological principles, what is to prevent a future alignment of capitalist democracies against socialized ones?

If we attempt to get rid of these difficulties by erecting only a single and all-inclusive world federation, we shall exaggerate many of the faults of the old League instead of avoiding them, faults which the more limited kinds of federation were devised to minimize. Sovereign nations will consent to be federated only on terms of equality with one another, whereas in reality they are not equal in terms of population, military power, industrial or cultural advancement. Nor are they all equally concerned with the same problems. In such a federation there would be repeated on an extreme scale the conflicts which plagued the League, involving methods of distributing votes, the interests of the small powers versus those of the large, the tendency to form blocs and the general blockading of constructive action by the insistence on abstract legal rights and the fear of precedents. Are we well enough satisfied with the behavior of representative institutions in the United States, on a less than continental scale, to aspire to nothing better in the way of world government than a parliament of man, based on a federation of many theoretically equal but exceedingly diverse nations?

Various ingenious political devices have been suggested to get around these obstacles within a federation, but none is applicable to the basic criticism which Mr. Mitrany makes. This criticism is that all such suggestions look backward rather than forward; they are rooted in a tradition which is appropriate to centuries that have passed, and is rapidly wearing away. The people are impatient of politics and politicians in the customary sense of the word; they are much less interested in government conceived as formal constitution and laws, with power to forbid and regulate, than they are in welfare and in opportunity for meaningful activity. The concept of abstract rights is rapidly giving way to that of function.

It was natural, at the time when national governments were created and the liberal democratic traditions of constitutional law were first formulated, that such concepts as sovereignty and rights should be emphasized. For then the state was struggling for independent existence among the competing loyalties of the middle ages, and the individual was freeing himself from the status of feudalism to participate in a society governed by contract. While police powers are still necessary to protect people against violence and fraud, the greatest usefulness of the modern state, and its most rapidly developing aspect, lie in its ability to take positive action of many kinds in the interest of the citizens. If we think of international government mainly in terms of police and bills of rights, as many do, we think of it in terms more appropriate to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries than to the twentieth and twenty-first.

What Mr. Mitrany advocates is the functional approach to international organization. Let us see what jobs are to be done, and then let us organize the instrumentalities best adapted to doing each of them. For this, nations do not need a formal international government with a constitution and a legislative assembly. They have already proceeded in this direction very effectively in a number of specific instances, without any over-all world state. Separate agreements are made in each case, among the nations most concerned, and according to methods of representation appropriate to the purpose in hand. Some of them are regional and some are more inclusive. The regions differ for different purposes. Mr. Mitrany calls attention to the parallel in the regional activities of numerous administrative agencies in the United States, from such a river-valley authority as the TVA to the regions outlined for the twelve Federal Reserve Banks. It has been stated that there are 120 different administrative regions in the United States, with different systems of boundaries according to the end sought.

Internationally, we have the various constructive agencies developed under the League for such purposes as the control of the drug traffic or the protection of labor standards, and we have regional treaties of all sorts, for purposes as varied as developing river valleys and regulating fishing rights in the ocean. We have just started a new international relief organization, UNRRA, and there are contemplated others such as an exchange stabilization agency, an international investment bank and an international development corporation. Questions of sovereignty, of differences in power and of equitable representation arise in these agencies too, but they are capable of being subordinated because of common interest in the specific purpose in view and the benefits to be obtained. Instead of debating about formal equality, we take by such means the kind of action which tends in the direction of real equality. It is no such wrench with tradi-

tion for the United States Senate to vote to participate in an agency of this sort as it would be to ratify the constitution of a world political state.

Policing and legal agencies of the traditional kind can also be provided by special treaties or executive agreements. We could not, to be sure, have a wholly independent world police force without a world government exercising sovereignty, but it is not realistic to suppose that any such force could replace the armies, navies and air fleets of the great powers for many years to come, at least as long as there is any possible danger of aggression from a great militaristic power. A world court is already in existence, and it can be used more fully in the future than in the past.

Positive and functional international agencies would provide the substance of international organization in a way that paper constitutions and idealistically constructed legislative assemblies could not. They are easier to inaugurate, to adapt to circumstances, to develop, and to abandon if occasion requires. They would provide a government seeking specific public goals rather than the perpetuation of power, and consisting of trained specialists rather than of politicians whose specialty is the winning of elections rather than the efficient performance of public service. About these agencies would cohere the common interests which would be essential if any political government in the ordinary sense is ever to have reality on an international scale. And if skillfully operated, they would help to bring the more backward peoples to the material and cultural level of the more advanced, thus aiding genuine equality and cohesion.

There is, of course, the problem of integrating their activities with each other, so that they shall not duplicate or work at cross purposes. But this task is also a technical one—it is partly executive and partly a matter of planning. There is little assurance that it could be performed better under a world political federation than without it.

Where, it may be asked, in all this is the role of democracy? If we are never to elect anybody to legislate for this vast and complicated machinery or to run it, how are we to prevent it from getting into the hands of self-seeking interests or callous bureaucrats? The answer is—though this is not explicitly presented in Mr. Mitrany's argument—that if we are to fulfill democracy in the modern world anyway, we must do it without our functional agencies, and from the bottom up rather than from the top down. We have developed a curious belief in the United States that if only we elect the right man as President, he will attend to everything else for us. We are just beginning to discover that he can't.

The problem of expressing the popular will is a real one, and must be attended to in any kind of government we establish. But the most genuine expressions of democracy today are in the administrative

agencies which have a job to do in the interest of the people, and not in the Congresses and Parliaments. If the people of all nations can make their own respective governments democratic, they will have performed a herculean task, without attempting the additional feat of controlling a central government on the traditional model which includes the entire world.

This is, in essence, Professor Mitrany's argument, with some embellishments of our own. We are not certain that it does not need correction, but it does merit serious consideration.

The Baruch Plan

BERNARD M. BARUCH and John Hancock, of Lehman Brothers, have now completed their report on the demobilization of our industry after the war and the transfer to a peace economy. In essence, they want the government to get out of business as quickly and as completely as possible. A committee would be set up in the Office of War Mobilization to sell off government-owned property; it would include representatives from eight or nine war agencies, each of which would be responsible for selling the kind of property that is its specialty; the Maritime Commission would sell ships, and so on. A special official would supervise the task of putting soldiers back into private life. They would get loans, if necessary, to tide them over, and small businesses would also be aided for a similar purpose. Firms with war contracts would be paid off with great speed under the plan proposed by Mr. Baruch himself a few weeks ago.

Mr. Baruch's general proposals are conventional. He says stoutly that we don't need to have a depression after the war. He wants a shelf of public works to be ready in case business should slump. In general, he would cut down the public debt and reduce taxes. He proposes that Congress write a postwar tax bill now and put it on ice, ready to be instituted at the proper moment by pressing a button. He wants a congressional committee to sit continuously, coöperating in the work of reconversion. He doesn't want the Controller General to review prices on government property sold, but only to watch out for frauds. He wants Congress to renew the laws giving the government control of prices and the allocation of raw materials, which are soon to expire. Finally, he seeks to offset the false idea that if we begin to think now about reconversion this means that the end of the war is in sight.

Will the President accept Mr. Baruch's ideas? It seems reasonable to predict that he will. The report was made at the request of the government; Mr. Baruch has great and well deserved prestige. The only adverse criticism thus far heard comes from Senator George, who agrees with the main principles of the report but says that the job should be done by Con-

gress. If executive tasks of this sort ought to be carried out by the legislative branch of the government, it will be surprising news indeed to all students of the Constitution.

In its devotion to "free enterprise," the report should surprise no one. While Mr. Baruch is not exactly an orthodox business man, he has never shown any sympathy toward collectivism. He assumes that private capitalism will continue to dominate America and that what we want is to get back to it as quickly as possible. Probably most Americans at the present time agree with him, or at any rate, most members of that powerful minority which creates public opinion at the effective level. Undoubtedly most members of Congress agree. It is worth remembering that this report will be put into effect, if at all, by the next President of the United States, whoever he may be. The same directive would have very different meaning if operated by Mr. Dewey or Mr. Bricker rather than by Mr. Roosevelt.

Bearing this reservation in mind, we are bound to record the fact that the Baruch report opens the door to graft on a vaster scale than has ever yet been dreamed of. The United States has built war plants worth many billions of dollars; they are turning out goods today at an annual rate probably in excess of \$30,000,000,000. These plants are now under lease to private management. While some of them will have to be closed down after the war because we cannot use their products (see Richard T. Frankenstein's article on page 274 of this issue), many more of them should be retained and operated. In numerous cases the privately owned plants from prewar days are now technologically obsolete or obsolescent. There is no doubt that the private managers are now preparing to buy these new plants from the government at 10 or 20 cents on the dollar. Mr. Baruch's plan would give the Controller General the chance to act in the case of fraud; but where would fraud come in regarding a low price, in the case of a government anxious to sell, in fact compelled to sell, and a buyer who in most cases would probably be the only bidder?

It just happens that much of the government investment has been in industries which lend themselves most readily to monopoly or to cartelization. Thus Uncle Sam has invested about a billion in steel plants; half a billion in the machine-tool industry; half a billion in rubber; a third of a billion in magnesium; a quarter of a billion in airplanes; half a billion in aviation gasoline and a fifth of a billion in pipelines. If the Baruch plan goes through, not only will the government lose nearly all of its money, but it will lose a potent possible control over domestic and international monopolies, which constitute a grave threat to our democratic system.

H. S. Person has already suggested in *The New Republic* a possible solution of the problem ("How

to Control Monopolies after the War," December 27, 1943). Let the government retain at least the ownership, perhaps ownership and operation, of a percentage of the plants in each of those industries which are either monopolies, or tend in that direction. By such yardstick operations, the government can effectively make sure that the prices are kept down and that technological advance is rapid, neither of which things is a primary aim of private business. Canada is preparing to do this with her war industries, on terms that go far beyond a mere yardstick. So is Great Britain. Yardstick operation is common in other countries, notably in Scandinavia; where Sweden, for example, owns one-third of her electric-power industry and finds such ownership extremely useful.

Government ownership of part of the plants, with or without government operation, would form something of a bulwark against depression, by curbing excessive profits. To realize how inadequate is the Baruch proposal for a shelf of public works as a safeguard against unemployment, one has only to read the symposium, "A Postwar National Fiscal Program," beginning on page 265 of this issue. We can see nothing in the Baruch plan or, for that matter, in any of the postwar plans put forward by such groups as the Committee for Economic Development, to prevent another 1929, or even another 1932, with veterans of this war selling apples on the street corners.

People keep saying that the United States has turned conservative. We are not aware of any evidence that this is true, at least at the level of the average voter. But even if it were true, it would not mean that we have to throw common sense out the window. Why should we lose 80 or 90 percent of our investment in hundreds of magnificent factories, built with our money, when by retaining our interest in at least part of them, we can fight monopoly, high prices, technological backwardness, and at the same time help to maintain employment and prosperity?

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A Postwar National Fiscal Program

The New Republic asked Mr. Beardsley Ruml to outline what he considers a wise fiscal policy for the United States in the postwar period. Mr. Ruml, in addition to being the author of the famous "Ruml Plan" for getting taxation on a current basis, is treasurer of R. H. Macy & Company, chairman of the New York Federal Reserve Bank and a director of the National Bureau of Economic Research. At our invitation, Mr. Ruml's suggestions are discussed by George Soule, an editor of The New Republic, a director of the National Bureau of Economic Research and a trustee of the National Planning Association; Oswald W. Knauth, former president of the Associated Dry Goods Corporation and professor at Princeton, staff member of the National Bureau of Economic Research; and Alvin H. Hansen, Littauer Professor of Political Economy at Harvard University and adviser to the Federal Reserve Board, author of "Full Recovery or Stagnation" and "Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles." — THE EDITORS

TODAY most business men agree that the elimination of mass unemployment is the first requirement for the postwar period. Many will go so far as to agree that unless mass unemployment can be eliminated under a system of private business enterprise, private business enterprise will be supplanted by some other arrangements for the production and distribution of goods and services. The demonstration of what we and others are able to produce under the rules of a wartime economy is unanswerable evidence of what machines and men and organization can accomplish if their technical capacities are given full rein. And we know that at the present time, with the newness of the wartime conditions under which we are working, the organizational and administrative arrangements are of much less effectiveness than they will become with longer experience. And so, for these good reasons, much thought is being given to the ways and means whereby private enterprise may do its full part in achieving high production and high employment in the postwar period.

But it would be folly to expect that business can make the transition from full wartime employment to high peacetime employment without coöperation from public government at every level—federal, state and local.

These measures of coöperation between government and business are good, but they are not enough. In addition, we require for success in the attack by business and government on the danger of mass unemployment a commitment on the part of government that, through an explicit fiscal and monetary policy, it will act when

business, as business, cannot act to sustain employment and effective demand.

To put it another way, it is inescapable that the national state, through an explicit and implemented fiscal and monetary policy, must complement and supplement the activities of private business in the maintenance of high production and high employment.

Business wants a fiscal program that will help it create good products, good jobs and good investments. Business does not expect a national fiscal policy to do the work of business for it. It does ask for coöperation in maintaining a flow of purchasing demand that will have some general correspondence to what agriculture, labor and business are able to produce and distribute.

Business knows that fiscal policy alone cannot produce a healthy condition of high employment and high production. In addition to a sound fiscal policy, there must be government stability, protection against illegal aggression, confidence in the outlook for profitable relationships among volume, costs and prices, access to markets and to the means of production. But the fiscal policy here suggested will aid strongly in getting the high production and high employment we all want; and it will also check tendencies toward restrictive practices that spring from fear of insufficient effective consumer demand.

A doctor friend of mine, some years ago, told me that if a patient was suffering from both tuberculosis and diabetes, the proper procedure is to treat the diabetes first. "First correct the disorder of metabolism, so that the body may be properly nourished and may help rather than hinder attack on the second disease."

This rule of medicine can be extended to a wider field. The body politic has long been suffering from undernourishment, caused in large measure by disorders of fiscal program. This undernourishment has brought with it restrictive practices that lead inevitably to government-controlled monopoly, class prejudice and international tension. The first step is to control the undernourishment, and to make sure that the lifeblood of purchasing demand is adequately maintained. Only then can we truly appraise the nature of the other evils that afflict us; only then can we decide with confidence on the other measures that ought to be applied.

As a step toward agreement on long-term policy, I have suggested for discussion a nine-point postwar federal fiscal program.

First, we want no public spending for its own sake and no projects merely because they support purchasing power in general. Let us base our budget estimates on the efficient and economical carrying out of worthwhile activities to accomplish our national purposes.

Second, let us lower tax rates to the point where they will balance the budget at an agreed level of high employment. We do not want a deflationary tax program at times of less than standard high employment. Taxes should be reduced where they will do the most good in creating demand and encouraging private enterprise.

Third, having set our tax rates to balance the budget at high employment, let us leave them alone, except as there are major changes in national policy. When employment goes beyond an agreed level, or if, with high employment, we have a boom in prices, let us hold the surplus or use it to reduce the national debt, not as an excuse for further tax reduction.

Fourth, let us hold onto the principle of progressive income taxes and estate taxes as the best way of reversing the tendency of purchasing power to come to rest. Let us reduce the rates on the individual income tax to stimulate consumption and to make possible investment in new enterprise on a business basis.

Fifth, let us plan our public works, not to balance the whole economy, but to help toward stabilizing the construction industry. Our objective should be to provide in this basic industry continuous activity within agreed limits throughout the year and over the years. This would require advance planning of public-works—federal, state and local—scheduling, and the holding back of a large reserve of optional projects.

Sixth, let us neutralize the social-security programs as far as their fiscal influences are concerned. Since their beginning they have been highly deflationary. For old-age security, let us set our rates and benefits so that they come somewhere near balancing; and for unemployment insurance, let us set our rates so that intake and outgo balance at high levels of employment as it may be defined.

Seventh, let us keep the important excise taxes for the time being, and get rid of the rest. If employment and production lag overmuch, let us get rid of these too, except when they have some social purpose, since they are deflationary. We need no general sales tax for fiscal policy purposes, now that the individual income tax is on a current basis.

Eighth, let us arrange our lending abroad, whether for stabilization, relief or long-time reconstruction, so that it will support rather than contradict fiscal policies adopted to strengthen our domestic economy.

Ninth, and indispensably, let us press for a reorganization of the parts of the federal government that have to do with fiscal policy and administration. We want clarity in policy, consistency in administration and coöperation between the executive and legislative branches. We shall expect that necessary coöperation of fiscal policy and monetary policy at the federal level will be attained easily along the way. Having gone this far, we will then want to study more intensively the problems of coördination among federal, state and

local governments, since all public expenditure and tax policies affect national fiscal policy itself.

This nine-point program raises some questions, and leaves a great deal to be filled in. But if the program makes sense, there are no constitutional or technical reasons why it could not be adopted as a framework now, to be ready once peace is declared and we are able to begin to resume our peacetime way of life. During the transition period after the war, the nine-point program itself cannot be expected to eliminate the need for some public expenditure for relief and rehabilitation. But it will provide a flow of purchasing demand, which springs authentically from the tens of millions whose tax burdens will have been reduced. It will express in a mosaic aggregate the popular interpretation of the American way of life as pictured in consumer preferences. Against this background the readjustments of employment and the reconversion of business and industry can more readily occur. I have remarked elsewhere, "Why not leave at home, for expenditure by the individual, money that would have to be pumped out again to sustain employment?" The nine-point program is a way of carrying out the policy implied in this simple question.

Much has been said and written about public works as a means of providing employment and of evening out the business cycle. Lately, we have become familiar with the phrase "a shelf of projects" to be ready if business should become depressed.

We must not expect too much from a public-works program as a general support for high employment. If we believe in the policy of no wasteful public expenditure and no spending for its own sake, the administrative difficulties make proper timing almost impossible, and reduce the potential volume well below the requirements of a true depression. Public works alone cannot do the job.

The most we can expect, and this is no small gain, is that public works can be planned and undertaken in such a way as to even out the activities of the construction industry itself, thereby providing a reasonable level of construction throughout the year and year after year. Some rough approximation could be made of what aggregate employment in construction would be suitable over a period of years, and to maintain the desired volume of construction, public works might be undertaken when private construction fell off.

What level of employment in the construction industry should we take as a long-time normal? The suggestion has been made that we might take as a rough standard the average rebuilding of our physical plant once a generation. This suggestion has the appeal of picturing each generation turning over to the next generation new, modern structures instead of old, outmoded houses, schools and factories. It has been estimated that such a program would require about eight percent of the national produce and would

keep 6,500,000 men employed on and off site; but this figure should only be taken as a preliminary approximation.

But, as I have said, it seems to me unreasonable, indeed I feel that it is reckless optimism, to expect that public-works expenditures can be counted on as a balancing factor for the economy as a whole. However, if we could only achieve reasonable balance in the construction industry itself, a great deal would have been accomplished.

A reasonably continuous level of activity in the construction industry within the year and over the years would greatly increase the efficiency of the industry and any given level of employment would yield a larger and larger product as the years went by. The traditional recurrent idleness of men and equipment in the construction industry has forced for sheer survival the adoption of practices which all deplore.

These practices, I feel sure, can be largely eliminated once the industry comes to have confidence in continuity of activity. But as these practices now exist, they are a serious obstacle to the use of the construction industry as a publicly supported agency for employment.

A program for stabilizing the construction industry through the use of public works should be preceded by a thorough congressional inquiry into the industry, with recommendations that would result in its reorganization. I am thinking of an inquiry of the scope, dignity and competence of the National Monetary Commission, following which the Federal Reserve System was established. It is possible that such an inquiry would find that certain of the restrictive practices of the industry should be continued even under high, stabilized production. If so, they should be sanctioned by law and supervised by an appropriate regulatory body.

The construction industry, stabilized by public-works expenditures and regulated in the public interest, would be a very different industry from what it is today. It would still be competitive, just as the radio or the banks or the airlines are competitive; it is possible that the industry would be even more competitive than it is today. Certainly, earnings of workers would be larger and profits higher. The dominant factors in the industry would turn to innovations and economies as their way of bidding for a larger section of the construction pie.

An industry that is looked to for eight percent of the national product is certainly a matter of national concern. The industry is indispensable as a source of essential public works, of housing and transportation, and as an outlet for the investment of the people's savings. The industry should be given a chance under the law to reorganize for the most efficient service to the community as a private, competitive, regulated construction industry.

Now is a particularly good time for a congressional inquiry into the needs of the construction industry. There is today no scandal that would obscure real problems and result in distorted legislation. Further, in the period immediately after the war, the industry will probably be in a fairly healthy condition as far as demand is concerned. During this period the inquiry could go on without the presence of crisis in the industry forcing premature judgments.

There is an opportunity for the pattern of the construction industry to be redrawn in the years immediately ahead, resulting in a new pattern that will give stability and order to the industry; efficiency, modernization and lowered cost construction to the public; and sound public-works programming to the federal government.

The attainment of high levels of employment will still leave many individual men and women in need. A modern industrial society with its enormous productive capacity can give a certain minimum protection to the individual citizen against the occasion of unemployment, destitution in old age, accident and disease. It can assess the burden of this minimum protection with reasonable fairness against the aggregate national product. I do not believe that such humane provision will weaken our energies or our ambitions, nor do I feel that we require the spectacle of fortuitous human distress to teach us the wisdom of avoiding error and evil.

But whatever provision for social security is adopted as public policy, let us be sure that in financing it we aid rather than hinder the gaining of high employment, which is, after all, the best social security for most people.

Plans for world economic relationships have recently received a great deal of governmental attention and public discussion. For the success of all these international plans, a high level of employment and production in the United States is everywhere conceded to be indispensable. With high prosperity, we shall require large imports of raw materials, and we may even welcome the economic advantages of lower tariffs on foods and manufactured goods. With high prosperity, we shall be less greedy for foreign outlets to take up low-cost excess capacity and we shall be more willing to see our exports directed to the world's essential needs.

The critical program for high prosperity for the United States has been too little emphasized in official circles. The problem of domestic recovery and long-term prosperity should no longer be so neglected nor should it be relegated to the private agencies of agriculture, labor and business. Much as these private agencies can and must do, they cannot do all, indeed they cannot even do their part, without proper governmental leadership and cooperation.

We must succeed at home if we are to succeed abroad. Our great contribution to world peace and freedom can only be made if we are able to use our unparalleled advantages in establishing here, at home, a high standard of prosperity and democracy.

BEARDSLEY RUMML

George Soule:

BEARDSLEY RUMML's nine-point program, as he says, leaves a good deal to be filled in. In the most important aspect of all—its relation to a compensatory fiscal policy—he has failed to explain its implications. Since Mr. Rumml is perfectly capable of doing his own explaining, I infer that he had a good reason for leaving this aspect of the program indefinite. I think I know what the reason was.

Business men and bankers are, on the whole, shy creatures, easily subject to negative conditioning. Yet, as long as the system of private enterprise prevails, we cannot maintain high employment without their consent and cooperation. Mr. Rumml is both a business man and a banker, and so he knows what kind of words bring favorable responses from the community of private enterprise. He has used such words in his proposal—for example, reduced taxation, balanced budget, public works useful only for their own sake. This language sounds as if it had nothing to do with the phrases which would set off a negative response in business—deficit financing, government borrowing, public investment and other terms of the Keynesian school. In fact, it sounds so stuffy that simple-minded advocates of a compensatory fiscal policy may attack Mr. Rumml as a representative of the predatory rich, just as they once did in connection with the famed "Rumml plan." But Mr. Rumml was once a professor, too, and it seems to me that he knows well what he is doing. It is a shrewd exercise in semantics. If he is subject to attacks from the Left, that will be so much the better for his cause. Therefore I beg both business men and Left journalists to stop reading at this point. What follows is merely for those who are more interested in the subject matter than in signals for conditioned combat.

First let me state in brief and oversimplified form what appear to be the essentials of the theory of a compensatory fiscal policy. In our economy, there is a tendency for people to save money faster than money is invested in new production. This means that there occurs, from time to time, a net reduction in the total of purchasing power in circulation. The result is depression and unemployment. The government can compensate for this shrinkage by spending enough more than it collects in taxes—that is, by borrowing and an unbalanced budget. It thus can keep up the total of circulating purchasing power.

Note that the government deficit which is necessary if this stimulating effect on employment is to be produced can theoretically be achieved in either or both

of two ways—first, by increased government spending; second, by reduction of taxes. Advocates of the policy have hitherto placed their emphasis on increased spending. This was logical at a time when the budget was not large enough so that a sufficient stimulus could be obtained by tax reduction. Starting, however, from the war level, there is much more leeway for tax reduction. If public spending were not reduced too far after the war, a sizable deficit, if needed, could be brought about by collecting less in taxes. It would be as effective for the government to leave more money in the hands of people who might be expected to spend it as it would be for the government to spend that money.

Now we are ready to examine the implications of Mr. Rumml's second point—"lower tax rates to a point where they will balance the budget at an agreed level of high employment." The budget, that is, would be balanced at the tax rates fixed if the high level of employment existed. No advocate of a compensatory fiscal policy would object to that; he does not want an unbalanced budget when employment is high. In point three, Mr. Rumml declares for keeping tax rates unchanged, once they have been set. If this produces a budgetary surplus during a boom, don't reduce taxes, he says, but pay off the public debt. Again he is in accord with the compensatory policy: this is its standard recommendation for moderating inflation. Mr. Rumml doesn't say directly what to do if employment falls below the agreed level. It is clearly implied, however, by his points two and three, that there would be a budgetary deficit in this case, and that he would not favor increasing taxes to wipe out the deficit.

Conservatives would of course howl as soon as this deficit appeared, and there would be immense pressure on Congress to wipe it out by cutting government expenditures. While it is practically impossible to balance the budget in a severe depression, enough could be done in this direction to upset any effective compensatory policy. What has Mr. Rumml to say about deficit spending? Again, nothing directly. But other points of his plan are relevant. He wants government to do whatever is necessary to stabilize the construction industry, by being ready with a forward program of public works. We may assume that we should not have a deep depression if construction were active. If government invariably spent more for public works at the times when private construction fell off, we may be 99-percent sure that it would increase its spending at a time when general unemployment markedly increased. Especially so if, as Mr. Rumml recommends, it also spent whatever was necessary for unemployment relief, and the social-security system were so financed that it did not remain a deflationary influence.

I think it needs to be emphasized, however, that in a period of unemployment the only active stimulus would be one which actually increased the spending of money by somebody. If you reduce tax rates some time

before a depression arrives, and then a budgetary deficit develops during the depression simply because people, having smaller incomes, do not pay so much taxes on them, there is no stimulus to spending in that deficit. In order to produce such a stimulus, the government would either have to spend more or reduce tax rates again.

Another important point needs to be kept in mind, when one advocates tax reduction rather than increased spending as a stimulus to economic activity. The reduction will do no good for the purpose in mind unless the taxpayers who are relieved actually spend the windfalls they receive instead of saving an additional amount. This implies reduction in the lower brackets rather than in the higher—unless we have some means of being sure that the money relinquished to the large taxpayers is actually going to be spent or invested. But with a tax structure which reaches as far down in the income scale as the present one, there is every reason to expect that the bulk of the relief would be felt in the lower brackets.

Finally—and this applies to the more familiar forms of the policy as well as to Mr. Ruml's—the doubt remains that even the best and most acceptably stated fiscal policy can be effectuated by the usual political means, especially in the United States. This subject is covered briefly in Mr. Ruml's ninth and indispensable point. I wish him luck in coordinating federal fiscal agencies, the Executive and Congress, and the federal government and the states. But I fear that Senators Byrd, George and Taft will live forever, and that when the next depression comes they will still be assailing an unbalanced budget, to the plaudits of editorials in *The New York Times*.

Oswald W. Knauth:

MR. RUML'S PROGRAM is a daring admixture of tax orthodoxy and innovation. He takes as basic the need for a balanced budget, not so much from a financial point of view as from a point of view of fiscal policy and the psychological necessity of ensuring confidence in the monetary system. His innovation is that he builds his tax structure around the principle of increasing the effective demand for goods rather than the encouragement of business profits. And in this he is essentially correct. For if the demand for goods is large, then business executives can adjust their affairs to attain soundness. But if the tax system stifles the demand of consumers and investors, then no lowering of rates can bring about sound business.

The actual rates charged must depend on the demands of the actual budget, which will be large. Current estimates are in the neighborhood of \$18,000,000,000. So that, necessarily, taxation will be heavy. But these demands can be met by a healthy economy; they cannot be met by a prostrate economy. And this

healthy economy can only be achieved by a confident demand on the part of consumers for goods and by the recreation of an investment demand.

These nine points should be studied in connection with Mr. Ruml's paper on National Fiscal Policy. For the application of the principle involves the use of the methods of the new economic school rather than a return to orthodox principles. He accepts the thesis that purchasing power affects the industrial structure in various ways according to the source from which it springs. Accordingly, the tax structure must be so adjusted that a maximum of demand is left in the hands of the dynamic members of society, who will utilize it most effectively rather than allow it to lie stagnant.

This approach might be defined as Keynesian, applied in the orthodox fashion of implementing prosperity rather than for the redistribution of income or changes in corporate policy. Needless to say, Mr. Ruml doffs his hat to the orthodox—and sound—belief that fiscal policy cannot dominate economic conditions. But in so far as it does affect economic conditions, it is an element in the prosperity, or lack of it, which will follow the war. Indeed, fiscal policy is negative in the sense that while it cannot create prosperity, it can hamper it.

Obviously, demand for consumption ensures the most rapid circulation of currency. And at the other end of the scale is the unused currency which lies in stockings or safe-deposit vaults. In between are the funds for various kinds of investment: at one end the enterprise capital on which innovations depend; at the other the three-percent bonds.

This approach leads to the requisite of lower income-tax rates—especially for those who immediately spend income on consumption and for those who would invest in new enterprises. But the objective of this is not so much for the sake of relieving all persons from the burden of high taxes as it is for the sake of stimulating a healthy economy. Similarly, excise taxes are condemned because they remove purchasing power from the control of that part of the community which would bring it most rapidly into circulation. On the same considerations, the present high rates of social-security taxes remove purchasing power from individuals and drop it into a stagnant pool where it does no good. Income and outgo should therefore be brought to a balance.

Mr. Ruml's contribution to the tax controversy is that he has demonstrated that the Keynesian approach can be applied to create a dynamic and progressive economy and that it has been misconceived because it has been used by those who believed that capitalism had reached stagnation. Any scheme of taxation based on despair is bound to be so burdensome that it prevents the recurrence of health, which alone makes it bearable. When to this spirit of despair is added the attempt to redistribute income, to change corporate practices and to stifle or encourage group interests,

then fiscal policy becomes a detriment to the country. It remains to be seen whether the data on which judgments of the rapidity of circulation are based prove to be sufficiently accurate to justify them as a basis for tax policy. At present these data are scattered and vague—and must be supplemented with judgments. Whether these judgments can be uniformly correct will determine the soundness of this approach. Even if the dynamic elements among consumers and investors can be singled out, so that they will be left with a maximum purchasing power and the stagnant elements bear the major burden of taxation, there are still difficulties.

For, as Mr. Ruml points out, the structure of our government is such that no single agency can implement our tax policy. Indeed, it is questionable whether any policy can develop out of the heterogeneous forces which create and administer our tax laws. A reorganization is essential.

Alvin H. Hansen:

MR. RUMI'S ANALYSIS of postwar fiscal policy is a highly constructive document and will contribute, I think, very much toward a rational solution.

My comments are largely in the nature of interpretation of his statement, which interpretation, however, necessarily involves reading between his lines, and he may not always agree with what I say. In part, my comments are qualifications. With the general framework of his proposal I wholly agree. At points my emphasis is somewhat different.

I like very much his statement about the consequences of prolonged undernourishment of the body politic. Severe depression and unemployment throw all relationships out of balance. An expansionist fiscal program leading to high income and employment makes it possible to attack wage, price and other policies with hope of success. As a *substitute* for expansionist fiscal policy these other methods are, however, doomed to failure. Indeed, one cannot judge what is a correct wage policy, for example, until high levels of employment are reached. When industry is running at half-capacity, wage rates will appear high which, however, would quickly turn out to be abnormally low as full-capacity output is approached. I welcome wholeheartedly Mr. Ruml's statement that the "first step is to control the undernourishment," and to ensure that the "purchasing demand is adequately maintained." Only then can we effectively attack the "other evils that afflict us" and improve the balance, workability and efficiency of a stable and full employment economy.

Let me take up his points in order.

Point 1. Every sensible person will certainly agree with the statement that we want no public spending for its own sake. However, I should much prefer to make it a positive statement. We want public spending

on useful and productive projects. We want a large enough volume of expenditures to provide a national minimum standard of public services in terms of health, education and social security. We want an adequate volume of expenditures for urban redevelopment and resources development. I think there is danger that Mr. Ruml's phrase will restrict the volume of useful and productive public expenditures far below what it really ought to be. In making our selection of useful and productive public projects, we ought to be concerned not merely with their direct benefits but also with the indirect repercussions upon the economy as a whole. A public investment and developmental program should be conceived broadly in terms of its overall effect upon the productivity, standard of living and real income of the nation as a whole. The TVA may not pay out in the narrower sense, but it is proving an eminently productive and profitable enterprise from the standpoint of its effect upon the whole national economy. I am afraid that Mr. Ruml's phrase will tend to make us take too narrow a view of the role of public expenditures. The fact is that the fields for useful and productive public spending will for some time be so great that we shall be compelled to limit ourselves to those that are the *most* useful and productive (taking account of their indirect as well as their direct benefits).

Point 2. Reduce taxes to the point where they will balance the budget at a high level of employment. This obviously means that we should not maintain a wartime tax structure. I entirely agree that we should drastically lower taxes and thereby increase private spending in order to promote full employment.

Point 3. Set the tax rates to balance the budget at high employment and leave the rates fixed. Two comments: First, I should rather say, balance the budget at high levels of private investment. We should not balance the budget unless investment is high enough to absorb the savings generated at high income levels. A rational fiscal program should aim to give us high employment even though it requires an unbalanced budget. The correct criterion for a balanced budget is, I think, a high level of private investment. But I imagine that Mr. Ruml uses the term "high employment" as a convenient phrase which will be more easily understood than the phrase "high level of private investment." My second comment is that I would be inclined to leave tax rates fixed except for the normal rate. When private investment falls, I would reduce the normal income-tax rate as a means of increasing private consumption expenditures, thereby powerfully supplementing other fiscal means to counter the depression. The mechanism of collection at the source makes it possible to use the normal income-tax rate as an effective compensatory device.

Point 4. I warmly support the principle of progressive income taxes and estate taxes. I would add that I would go relatively light on business and corporate in-

come taxation and rely more heavily on a progressive personal income tax.

Point 5. Plan public works not to stabilize the whole economy but to stabilize the construction industry. This indeed is not a modest goal but, if achieved, would be a tremendous step forward. Mr. Ruml underestimates his own proposal. From 1929 to 1933, construction, public and private, fell from \$10,000,000,000 to a little over \$2,000,000,000. Had public works been expanded enough to stabilize total construction in this period, it would have been a prodigious feat and would have made the depression a relatively minor one. Mr. Ruml's program involves an enormous fluctuation in public-works and public-improvement outlays, sufficient to offset fluctuations in private outlays on construction.

Broadly speaking, I would be inclined to say that immediately at the end of the war we ought to be prepared to face the sharp demobilization crisis by a considerable volume of road-building and relatively short-term public works. As we move into the restocking boom, fed from deferred demand, public construction could be cut back as private construction increases. Perhaps the total level of public and private construction in this period might be around \$10,000,000,000.

When the "restocking boom"—inventory accumulations, net export surplus, deferred demand for consumers' durables and for urgently needed business equipment—has spent much of its force, we may face a really serious postwar depression. At this point I think we should step up construction to perhaps \$18,000,000,000 or more. Should we thereafter try to maintain this volume? Mr. Ruml suggests a stabilized construction volume of eight percent of national product. If we assume a gross national product of \$160,000,000,000 or \$165,000,000,000 (national income of \$130,000,000,000 or \$135,000,000,000), that would mean about \$13,000,000,000 on construction. I doubt that this is enough. I think we should have, on the average, about \$6,000,000,000 to \$8,000,000,000 for housing, \$5,000,000,000 for business plant and about \$5,000,000,000 to \$7,000,000,000 of public works and improvement projects, federal, state and local. I should imagine that satisfactory progress over the next two decades in terms of urban redevelopment, housing, resource development, modernized and enlarged business and industrial facilities and standard public works would require a volume of construction at around \$18,000,000,000. Thereafter we should gradually move toward a higher consumption economy with less emphasis on construction. A really advanced society is not a "brick and mortar" society.

Point 6. Social-security tax collections should equal benefit payments, thus neutralizing the fiscal influence of these programs. I agree that these programs should not be deflationary. We should not build up big reserves. We should not collect more now in payroll taxes than we pay out. But, as the costs rise over time,

I would argue that this increase should be carried by the Treasury. Eventually we would thereby get a three-way contribution to social security somewhat on the Beveridge model, namely from employers, employees and the Treasury. If the Treasury's tax receipts come largely from progressive income taxes, such a social-security program will tend to have an expansionist influence on the economy. I agree with Mr. Ruml that we do not want it to be deflationary, but I see no reason why we might not instrument it in a manner to make it expansionist.

Point 7. I agree that we should have no peacetime general sales taxes, federal, state or local. I also agree that for the immediate future, at any rate, we should supplement the progressive income and estate taxes by liquor, tobacco and gasoline taxes. We should, however, continually study ways and means of reducing even these consumption taxes.

Point 8. Our long-term lending should be geared in with a stabilized domestic fiscal program. With this I wholly agree. Moreover, I have said repeatedly that the foundation stone for international economic stability is a high level of employment in the United States. I do not believe that there is any conflict between an internal program of full employment and international economic collaboration through an International Stabilization Fund, International Investment Bank and an International Commodity Corporation designed to stabilize international raw-material prices. The domestic and the international policies can and should reinforce each other. I heartily agree with Mr. Ruml that high prosperity for the United States is essential to any international program and that we must make this our first concern, but I would none the less stress the great importance of international collaboration.

Point 9. Reorganization of fiscal administration. I should argue that while we can do something with our present machinery, we cannot really achieve so effective a fiscal program as we need in order to maintain full employment unless we improve our fiscal administration. Administration of central banking policy within a pattern established by congressional action we have long been accustomed to. No one imagines that we could have effective monetary management if Congress were compelled to pass a law every time open market operations should be engaged in by the Federal Reserve. We shall sooner or later learn that we cannot achieve effective timing of expenditures on public projects or effective timing with respect to the normal income-tax rate without administrative control always within the limits imposed by authority granted from Congress and with continual reporting back to Congress. We need, moreover, as Mr. Ruml has pointed out, more effective coordination among federal, state and local governments in order to achieve throughout the nation as a whole a rational compensatory and developmental fiscal program.

The New Russian Enigma

THE SOVIET UNION has a penchant for surprising the world. It did so most effectively with its February 1 constitutional amendment permitting each of the sixteen Soviet republics to have independent international relations and sign treaties with foreign powers. Coupled with this was a decision to convert the Red Army into sixteen federated republican armies, each with a commissar of defense. Taken in connection with the constitutional right of secession, these steps looked to many Americans as if Stalin was gambling for high international stakes, even risking the dissolution of the Union for the ends in view.

The move has been interpreted all the way from a crudely clever scheme to get sixteen votes in a world organization, to a device for annexing the smaller states of Europe (that was the Nazi radio explanation), or, in the other direction, to a conversion of the Soviet Union into something resembling the British Commonwealth of Nations. The first step in trying to fathom the international significance of the move is to see how far it can be explained in terms of internal policy. Since it is axiomatic that the Soviet leaders have no intention of weakening or dissolving the USSR, it is necessary to ask why they think it is safe to take these steps. In my opinion there are three reasons.

First. The new autonomy does not extend to economic affairs or to the Communist Party, which directs government and industry throughout the Soviet Union. The sixteen republics will continue to have a centralized socialistic economy directed from Moscow. The directing force will continue to be a political party headed either by a dictator or by a small governing body made self-perpetuating by its control of the pyramided soviets below it. As long as centralized socialism exists, those who direct it will control all of the regional governments. Any international move contrary to the will of the Supreme Soviet, any refusal of military coöperation, any attempt to exercise the right of secession, will be branded as counter-revolutionary. The government that attempts it will be removed at once, either by party action or military power.

Great Russia—the RSFSR—contains 110,000,000 people against 31,000,000 in the pre-1940 Ukrainian SSR and 6,000,000 in the third largest, Uzbek. Successful counter-revolution, or anything that may be labeled counter-revolution, in these lesser republics is impossible except as an incident to foreign wars. Counter-revolution in Great Russia does not depend on regional rights, and its secession would not be secession, but expulsion of the others.

Second. The Soviet Union has pursued so broad and tolerant a policy in regard to national minorities that only the fire of war was needed to cement them into

an apparently indissoluble union. This unity existed, or at least I had the feeling that it did, before the war, for on returning to the United States in September, 1939, after visiting Russia in July, I wrote the following to a high executive of our government:

The thing that most impressed me in Russia was that the country was stronger defensively than it was credited with being. . . . Two other [than the army and heavy industry] sources of strength are the improved food situation and the absence of nationalist separatist movements—the Soviet policy of toleration toward non-Russian national minorities is paying dividends. It is only in the light of these facts that present Russian policy can be appraised. Russia has shifted from a policy based on weakness to one based on strength . . . and feels strong enough to stand alone against Hitler after Germany has been weakened by the campaign in the west.

To that I would add an extract from an article, "The Source of the Red Army's Strength," by I. Verkhotsev, published on June 22, 1943, the second anniversary of Hitler's invasion of Russia: "In these two years of war the friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union has undergone a severe test and is now stronger than ever. The active support of the millions of peoples of all nationalities inhabiting the Soviet Union is the inexhaustible force which makes the Red Army strong."

Third. When a socialist system is fully established, as it is in the Soviet Union, the political forces engendered by it are centripetal. They tend to draw the parts together by making them mutually independent, by dissolving sectional and racial economic rivalries and by turning individual rivalries into a competition for place and power inside the organized state economy. This contrasts strongly, and in a manner totally foreign to American experience, with the centrifugal force engendered by our competitive capitalism, out of which come intense sectional jealousies and the constant need to strike down state laws in the federal courts.

Taking account of these three factors, it appears that Stalin and company see no internal hazard whatever in the grants of sovereignty they are making to the individual republics. With no centrifugal force operating in the economic field, Russia feels able to take steps safely which, if taken in the United States, would revive on a larger scale the lament of George Washington in 1780: "I see one head gradually changing into thirteen. I see one army branching into thirteen. . . . I see the powers of Congress declining . . . and am fearful of the consequences of it."

How great will these grants seem to the sixteen Russian republics? Probably very slight additions to an autonomy which they regard as national but is only

cultural. Read, for instance, a 1943 description by Pavlo Tychina, deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine, of the past and present political status of the Ukrainian SSR:

After the Great October Revolution the Ukraine became free and in the full sense of that word, independent, for she is an equal member of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This equality, this independence, enabled the Soviet Ukraine to develop thoroughly her industry, science and literature; enabled her to live a full-blooded political life and to become an object of admiration to all the peoples of the world.

That should be read not for its accuracy—since it lumps together, as independence, a genuine cultural autonomy and Moscow's direction over industry—but for the feeling in it. From such a background, the right of the Ukraine to deal with foreign nations and to have a commissar of defense for Ukrainian armies must appear as a moderate but pleasing extension of national privileges. The first effect is to fortify that "friendship of the Soviet peoples" about which Russians are always orating, but which has back of it, in addition to sentiment, a firm federal structure on multi-national lines, with an all-powerful economic and political dictatorship at the center. For the fourteen lesser republics, the new international system may be more significant as a matter of national privilege, but even less so as a factor of power. In all of them, the one unmistakable purpose and assured effect is to strengthen the spirit of voluntary union, without noticeably lessening the compulsory ties. The change for the Red Army is slight. It is already organized, for convenience and morale, along racial and language lines, and these substantially coincide with the various republics, except in the Siberian maze. It avoids a multi-lingual requirement in officers and men.

What conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the relationship of Soviet reorganization to the multi-national state and centralized economic control?

It is evident first of all that state socialism, managed by a strong central government, is looked upon as permanent in Russia. Its abandonment would bring into play the centrifugal force of competitive capitalism and would leave only the military power of the main Russian republic, and the sense of common danger and devotion to "mother Russia," to hold the Soviet Union together. Such a reliance might prove sufficient, but if there were any thought of moving toward it, the present changes would not be made. They would be too dangerous.

Next, the move confirms the belief I expressed in "Road to Peace and Freedom," that Soviet Russia would not seek to bring a communized Germany into the USSR. My statement that "the entrance of Germany into the Soviet Union would be like a man swallowing a cannon ball" would apply with multiplied

validity to a system in which Germany, thus incorporated, would have a separate army and independent foreign relations.

The final definite conclusion is that Soviet Russia has no intention of entering upon a policy of expansion by military force outside the boundaries of the old Russian empire. A system of autonomy as complete as this one does not fit subjugated countries, nor countries in process of transition to socialism, for in the latter the vertical cleavages of the class struggle accentuate the centrifugal force of "free enterprise." If Russia were planning the absorption of Europe by force, every diplomatic move that could cause uneasiness would be avoided until the war was over and the Allied armies had gone home.

As a tentative conclusion, it may be doubted that the step is being taken to give the Soviet Union sixteen votes at the peace table or in a world organization. That would put it on the level of a crude trick, which a nation as powerful as Russia has no need to employ, and which would cost more in lowered prestige and confidence than it would gain in voting power. At the same time, it might be exceedingly useful to Stalin when he comes to discuss the single or multiple status of the British Commonwealth of Nations in a world body. Its most probable use in that respect is as an argument for some agreed ratio of multiple votes for Russia, the British nations, the United States and China in the postwar organization—but only as a by-product of the plan, not as the motive for its adoption.

Finally, we come to the most important conclusion of all, but it can only be stated as a question. Is the move intended to facilitate the voluntary entrance of European states into the Soviet Union?

Time alone will answer that question conclusively. At present it is only possible to point to the "yes" and "no" factors. On the affirmative side is the fact that such states as Bulgaria and Rumania seem almost inevitable additions to the Soviet system, by virtue of race, geography and social and economic conditions, and that a movement by one Balkan or central European country into the Russian orbit can easily start a defensive rush for affiliation by all the others.

Against the likelihood that this represents a planned Soviet drive for voluntary affiliation is, first, the fact that these rights of autonomy would have no appeal to a non-communist state which had real freedom of action. In such a state, the issue of affiliation would turn on the same revolutionary conflict between landlord and peasant, state socialism and private business, that was fought out in Russia a generation ago.

Second, there is enough warrant for the new autonomy in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, and in the known issues of the coming peace conference, to minimize, even though it does not wholly remove, the likelihood that the purpose is to aid a general policy of territorial expansion beyond present claims.

It will be far easier for Soviet Russia to obtain American recognition of Soviet sovereignty in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—tsarist provinces which were lost in 1921, regained in 1939, lost in 1941—if those countries, as autonomous members of the Soviet Union, merely send new ministers to supplant the diplomatic representatives who have held over from prewar days. However, the reasoning works in both directions, because it would also be true if a country like Bulgaria voluntarily entered the Soviet Union. We may reject the idea that any such scheme, affecting the whole Soviet Union, was adopted merely to lure the Baltic provinces.

The real use of this new autonomy—the only legitimate use that can be found for it, outside of the satisfaction it gives to all minor Soviet nationalities—is in diplomatic exchange and local treaties with countries bordering on the various Soviet republics, and in consular relations with emigrant groups. There it is useful only in dealing with foreign governments reasonably friendly toward Moscow. The Finnish-tongued Karelian SSR could deal more easily with Finland than the Soviet Union could, provided the larger Russo-Finnish relationship was satisfactory. At this moment, the blood relationship would only sharpen the conflict by bringing in the irredentist factor. The same would be true of a minor diplomat sent by the Moldavian SSR into Rumania, or White Russian and Ukrainian embassies to Poland—the major conflicts must be cleared up before the local uses can be realized. A Ukrainian consulate in Chicago would have immediate value to the Soviets.

On balance, the autonomous system appears to have more value as a long-range aid to peaceful relations of the Soviets with their neighbors, and to the self-satisfaction of the many nationalities which make up the Soviet Union, than as an instrument of Soviet expansion. In the latter field its utility is minimized by the fact that no such aid is necessary to bring a foreign Communist state into the Soviet Union, nor is it strong enough to bring a non-Communist state in. That would require the play of forces—such as the national rivalries in the Balkans—powerful enough to break down economic and social inhibitions.

We must recognize, however, that peaceful relations between Soviet Russia and small neighbors can easily develop into affiliation, when accompanied by contact between a gigantic, expanding national economy stretching across two continents, and a subcontinent in political and economic chaos. Perhaps the main reason for thinking that the Soviet move is related chiefly to the multi-national state and border problems is that the results feared outside of Russia are more likely to come to pass regardless of this move than because of it. It is least useful in the field where we are inclined to fear its use.

One thing we may be sure of. The importance of such a move is almost certain to be exaggerated in the United States because we see in it the tremendous disruptive force, and hence the hazard, which it would have if employed in a federal union like ours, with the diffusive drive of a capitalist economy.

IRVING BRANT

Postwar Jobs in Aircraft

STATISTICIANS like to say that war employment in the aircraft industry has not expanded—it has exploded. Substantially they are correct. In 1939 about 50,000 men and women made up the total working force of the American aircraft industry. Today nearly 2,000,000 are at work in aircraft plants over the nation. In addition at least 200,000 members of the armed forces are former aircraft workers with legal right to available jobs in that industry. Two out of every 17 workers now employed by American industry are aircraft workers.

What do these workers have to look forward to on the morning after the victory of the United Nations over the Axis? Will the explosive expansion of aircraft employment during the war be matched by an even sharper deflationary detonation once the demand for planes to smash the Axis has been met?

To look now for an answer to these questions is, in my opinion, a very direct and immediate part of the nation's war effort. For workers in the aircraft industry know and fear the spectre of postwar unemployment.

The men and women who trekked to Southern California or Detroit in search of a war job two years ago, are beginning now to look around for other jobs—jobs that will carry through into peacetime employment. Increasingly when the worker has freedom of choice among a number of jobs, his choice is for one in "permanent" industry rather than in the aircraft plants or shipyards.

Fear of the future—the conviction that regular paychecks are purely wartime phenomena—has bitterly intensified worker resentment against the inequitable application of government "stabilization" policies. The rigidities of the "Little Steel" formula seem doubly onerous to the worker who sees both his present and his future standard of living slashed by high prices. Inevitably, therefore, the nation is paying a price in terms of depleted production morale for failure to give the aircraft worker at least a fighting chance for future security.

Such a fighting chance for the aircraft worker has not been within the vision of those government experts

who have been charting, graphing and forecasting the future. A very pleasant statistical gentleman from the United States Department of Labor recently gave me and my fellow officers of the UAW-CIO his picture of what lay in store for us following victory over the Axis. His charts showed aircraft employment curving upward with all the verve of a skyrocket from 1940 on through 1943 and 1944. But then at 194— came the end of the war, and with it there was a fall in aircraft employment like the side of the Grand Canyon.

The "best" we could expect was to find employment for about 300,000 workers in the aircraft industry. Maximum annual production would be a little bit less than two weeks' output at the industry's present rate. One aircraft worker out of 15 might find a job in the industry. The rest would choose between unemployment and "withdrawal from the labor force."

I am convinced that those figures are accurate only if we do nothing to prevent them from being verified by reality. I do not believe that we must accept any assumption that the hundreds of thousands of workers, the Negroes, the women, the older workers—who are doing so magnificent a job on the assembly lines—must be rewarded by breadlines and continuing insecurity. Such an assumption of renewed unemployment for millions in the postwar world is an assumption of national defeat and chaos which I shall never be prepared to make.

Certainly some curtailment of aircraft production is inevitable. No presently conceivable peacetime economy could justify devoting 2,000,000 workers and \$12,000,000,000 a year to the production of aircraft. No worker wants to continue a situation in which the nation's life and liberty hangs on the production of 100,000 warplanes a year. I am confident, nevertheless, that our postwar aircraft industry can provide employment for well over a million workers—and become a mainspring of economic and social progress.

My own prediction is based, like those of the statisticians, upon certain assumptions. I am assuming:

1. That the United Nations carry through to a complete and unconditional victory over the Axis, and establish thereby the bedrock foundation to a peaceful and democratic world.

2. That political and economic coöperation among the United Nations continues to develop for winning the peace and assuring the democratic development of a world economy.

3. That the American people rally in this year's elections to defeat the rightist reaction at home which would snatch away from us the victory over fascism.

4. That American labor, industry and farm groups press for an economy of full production and employment, with gross national product running at levels of close to \$200,000,000,000 a year.

Not a single one of these assumptions represents any historic inevitability. But they are the fighting objec-

tives of hundreds of millions of common people throughout the world today. With certain important limitations, they are the objectives of industry groups who are learning in the war that world organization along fascist lines can lead only to their own destruction. We in the labor movement feel that we have a right to make these assumptions in our planning because we are fighting for their realization in the war factories today—and will vote, along with millions of our fellow citizens, for their realization in the elections next fall.

If the American people as a whole enjoy decent incomes and a rising standard of living, if the channels of international trade are fully opened up, if the system of autarchal self-sufficiency which characterized the early preparations of fascist powers for world domination is fully rooted out, then we can talk of one million jobs in the postwar aircraft industry in terms of solid and practical reality. Otherwise what we must talk about will not be jobs in the aircraft industry of peace, but jobs in the manufacture of weapons for a third world war. In the planning of such an economy I suspect that organized labor, together with readers of *The New Republic*, will be permitted very little to say.

What are steps necessary to the development of the aircraft industry in a democratic world?

First of all it is necessary, in my opinion, to work out measures to protect aircraft workers and their families in the period of conversion that will follow almost inevitably upon the cutting off of the monster load of war orders upon which the industry is now working. The Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill, together with increased state unemployment insurance, can do part of that vital job in protecting the health and economic welfare of those who built the planes for victory.

In addition, the UAW-CIO has brought before industry and government proposals for the accumulation of funds out of war profits from which severance and lay-off bonuses may be paid out to workers at the end of the war. This obviously non-inflationary measure is one which cries out for adoption by war agencies dealing with labor and wage policies. Retraining and educational projects for aircraft workers who do not plan to return to the industry should be initiated during the conversion period under government auspices.

A second and companion imperative is to shorten as much as possible this period of conversion and of tooling up for new production in aircraft plants. For this purpose I believe that an industry planning committee, with representatives of manufacturers, government and labor, should be established immediately. The extremely complex problems of plant disposal, of inventories, of determining which plants are to stand by ready for production of military planes, of where orders are to be concentrated as war demand tapers off—all these things can be decided in the interest of the nation only if labor is assured its rightful voice in the making of such basic decisions.

THE RESOLUTIONS BEFORE CONGRESS

Similarly worded Resolutions have been introduced into the House of Representatives by Congressmen Wright and Compton and into the Senate by Senators Taft and Wagner, in regard to the White Paper on Palestine and the constituting of Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth. The text of these Resolutions is as follows:

Whereas the Sixty-seventh Congress of the United States on June 30, 1922, unanimously resolved "that the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christians, and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine shall be adequately protected"; and

Whereas the ruthless persecution of the Jewish people in Europe has clearly demonstrated the need for a Jewish homeland as a haven for the large numbers who have become homeless as a result of this persecution: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the United States shall use its good offices and take appropriate measures to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be opened for free entry of Jews into that country, and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization, so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth.

Appearing before hearings of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Tuesday and Wednesday, February 8th and 9th, Mr. Lessing J. Rosenwald, President of the American Council for Judaism, made the following statement:

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you in regard to the Resolution on Palestine that you are now considering. I am deeply grateful for the spirit that has animated you and your fellow-congressmen to take up the cause of the suffering, dispersed and persecuted Jews of Europe. The consideration that you are giving to that problem is one more testimony of the fine American tradition of sympathy with, and help for, the unfortunates of all faiths. It is of a pattern with the recent action of our President in naming a War Refugee Board and with the formation in this city of a Committee headed by such distinguished public figures as Justice Murphy, Vice-President Wallace, Governor Goodland of Wisconsin, Governor Maw of Utah, and others, to counter the dread cancer of bigotry in our national life.

I appear here, both in my own capacity as an American citizen of Jewish faith and as President of the American Council for Judaism, Inc.

This organization, let me explain, was founded only recently to enlist support among like-minded Americans of Jewish faith in our stress on the religious character of the Jews and in resistance to the forces of racialism which we believe to be false doctrines in Judaism.

It may interest you to know that in the brief period of a few months, we have enlisted an active membership of close to 2500 leading Jews all over the country and the interest and approval of many, many more. We are still, as you see, a young organization but, I daresay, we are probably the most rapidly growing organization in the Jewish community in the United States.

With this brief introduction, I beg to call to your attention the following, relative to the Resolution now before both houses of Congress:

The text of the Resolution calls upon the United States to use its good offices for two purposes. I ask you to note that there are two purposes, that they are distinct and different and that they are, therefore, properly subject to different reactions.

One part of the Resolution calls for taking "appropriate measures to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be open for the free entry of Jews." I do not wish here to linger over the phrasing of this part of the Resolution. I do want to say that the purpose of this part of the Resolution is plainly humanitarian, consistent with American humanitarian traditions and characteristic of our desire to expand democratic processes wherever they can be expanded.

As you know, this Resolution has as its background the White Paper issued in 1939 by the British Government as the mandatory power for Palestine which, among other provisions, shuts the immigration doors of Palestine to Jews and restricts their acquisition of land in that country.

In a recent statement issued by the organization which I have the privilege of heading, we said as follows:

"We of the American Council for Judaism record our unqualified opposition to those provisions. In behalf of the substantial section of American Jews whose views on Jewish problems coincide with ours, we petition our Government to use its best offices to prevail upon the British Government not to proceed with so prejudicial and unjust a policy.

"We base our attitude on this fundamental fact: that proposals which exclude Jews, as Jews, from right of entry and restrict Jews, as Jews, from the acquisition of land, do violence to the fundamental concept of democratic equality and thus to the very purposes and ideals to which the United Nations are pledged.

"The American Council for Judaism is dedicated to the view that Jews, a reli-

gious community, shall have, as of right and not on sufferance, full equality all over the world. As stated in our Declaration of Principles, 'For our fellow Jews we ask only this: equality of rights and obligations with their fellow nations.' This means equality in the countries in which we live and choose to remain; equality to return to those lands from which Jews have been forcibly driven; equality to migrate wherever there is an opportunity for migration.

"We ask for no special privileges for Jews anywhere in the world. We will resist to the utmost the imposition of any disabilities on Jews anywhere in the world. There is no compromise on this basic demand."

This is the position of our membership and we believe that this viewpoint is supported by all American citizens of the Jewish faith and by an overwhelming body of our fellow-Americans of Catholic and Protestant faith.

We are, therefore, in hearty accord with the purpose of the first part of the Resolution. We feel that it seeks to express the profound and invaluable sympathy of the American people for those driven from their lands by tyranny and terror.

There is, however, a second section of the Resolution on which I feel obliged to convey to you, frankly and fully, our questions and our doubts as to its wisdom. It now reads, "... so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth."

I urge you to read and reflect on this part of the Resolution with the utmost care. This is no longer designed to serve a solely humanitarian purpose. This brings you, and through you—the American people—at once into a field of international controversy and into a subject that has deeply divided the Jewish community in this country.

(Continued on next page)

Advertisement

The proposal, you will note, speaks of the establishment of a free and democratic "Jewish" commonwealth. I stress the word "Jewish." It does not say the establishment of a free and democratic "commonwealth." It specifically uses the word "Jewish," a word which has essentially a religious connotation only, although it has been used in a racial sense by the Nazi enemies of the Jews and of democracy.

But the concept of the theocratic state is long past. It is an anachronism. The concept of a racial state—the Hitlerian concept—is repugnant to the civilized world, as witness the fearful global war in which we are involved. We have reached a point of civilization where nations and states have their proper recognition without regard to the religious composition of their populations. I urge that we do nothing to set us back on the road to the past. To project at this time the creation of a Jewish state or commonwealth is to launch a singular innovation in world affairs which might well have incalculable consequences.

It may well be that this was in the mind of the King-Crane Commission in its report to President Woodrow Wilson and the State Department in the years after the last war.

You will recall that President Wilson, disturbed by the problems of the Near East, dispatched a Commission there in 1919 for a careful survey. This Commission, known as the King-Crane Commission, was to submit a report which would be of assistance in the final formulation of the peace treaties. With regard to Palestine, that Commission reported that "a national home for the Jewish people is not equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish state." No doubt, your predecessors of the 67th Congress of the United States had this report at hand when they adopted the Resolution which forms a preamble to your present Resolution.

I ask you to look at your present Resolution again and, especially, at that part of it which reads, "... so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth."

The language of the Resolution thus makes "the Jewish people" the agency for the establishment of a free and democratic com-

monwealth. Here are some serious considerations on that section:

The accepted procedure of democracy is to have a commonwealth established with the participation of *all* of its people or citizens. It is a self-contradiction to speak of a democratic state organism which is the creation of only a part of the population within the country. The population in Palestine is made up of Christian, Mohammedan and Jew. I believe you will agree with me that true democratic developments in that country can only come about as the result of the efforts and with the participation of all of the elements of the population. *All* of Palestine must share in the establishment of a democracy. Any exclusion is undemocratic in character and defeats the very purpose that your Resolution may seek to achieve.

Moreover, the language of the Resolution places the responsibility for creating a commonwealth at the door of "Jewish people," presumably those outside of Palestine as well as those in Palestine.

Yet I wonder whether the authors of this Resolution actually intended this to be the case. The "Jewish people" are not organized politically, are not and do not want to be a political unit. They are nationals, loyal citizens of the various countries in which they live. They are to be found in all classes, in all political parties, in all economic levels. They are united only in their common derivation from a great religion and in their natural resistance to those who would destroy them. This being the case, it must be clear why the language of the second part of the Resolution can only create confusion and encounter perhaps insurmountable difficulties. Jews in the United States and the world over, not being a national group but essentially a religious community, it is clear that *they cannot assume responsibility anywhere as a political unit.*

The development of such institutions, in the last analysis, must be the responsibility only of those in Palestine at the time such institutions are developed. All sections of the country, Jews, Christians, and Mohammedans, Palestinians all, whose proper concern is the welfare of their country, will

determine and be responsible for its institutions.

In the Statement of Principles issued by the American Council for Judaism, we expressed the following views on Palestine:

"Palestine has contributed in a tangible way to the alleviation of the present catastrophe in Jewish life by providing a refuge for a part of Europe's persecuted Jews. We hope it will continue as one of the places for such resettlement, for it has been clearly demonstrated that practical colonizing can be done, schools and universities built, scientific agriculture extended, commerce intensified and culture developed. This is the record of achievement of eager, hardworking settlers who have been aided in their endeavors by Jews all over the world, in every walk of life and thought.

"We oppose the effort to establish a National Jewish State in Palestine or anywhere else as a philosophy of defeatism, and one which does not offer a practical solution of the Jewish problem. We dissent from all those related doctrines that stress the racialism, the nationalism and the theoretical homelessness of Jews. We oppose such doctrines as inimical to the welfare of Jews in Palestine, in America, or wherever Jews may dwell. We believe that the intrusion of Jewish national statehood has been a deterrent in Palestine's ability to play an even greater role in offering a haven for the oppressed, and that without the insistence upon such statehood, Palestine would today be harboring more refugees from Nazi terror.

"Palestine is a part of Israel's religious heritage, as it is a part of the heritage of two other religions of the world. We look forward to the ultimate establishment of a democratic, autonomous government in Palestine, wherein Jews, Moslems and Christians shall be justly represented; every man enjoying equal rights and sharing equal responsibilities; a democratic government in which our fellow Jews shall be free Palestinians whose religion is Judaism, even as we are Americans whose religion is Judaism."

I earnestly commend these views for your consideration. I believe that your own compassionate purposes will be fully served by retaining only the first part of the Resolution or by modifying its second provision so that it reads as follows:

"... and that there shall be full opportunity for colonization in Palestine, ultimately to be constituted a free and democratic commonwealth."

We invite readers of *The New Republic* to send us their opinions and to communicate with us on our program

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Public moneys to the value of nearly \$4,000,000,000 have gone into the construction and equipping of aircraft plants throughout the country. What use is made of that tremendous investment (about 40 times the industry's own investment from 1935-39) is a matter of crucial public concern.

Investigation should be immediately undertaken by such a tripartite committee to determine possible uses for postwar aircraft plants whose productive capacity will not be required in the predictable future.

Most aircraft-parts plants are readily convertible to the output of various types of consumers' durable goods. The aircraft-engine plants, with their batteries of basic machine tools, likewise are available for any and all types of metal fabrication. Final-assembly plants present a more difficult problem. Their jigs and fixtures are adapted for the most part to the production of only one plane model. Their tools are generally light and are not suited to a wide range of production. At a minimum, these plants represent a tremendous asset in available floor space in modern plants for the manufacture of anything from four-motor bombers to prefabricated houses or widgets.

For the conversion period and as long as unemployment exists, a thirty-hour week should prevail in the industry—with the guarantee of a decent annual wage.

Technological Problems.—Assuming the emergence of steady mass purchasing power, postwar aviation can become a mass industry like the automobile industry, provided only that certain technical problems are solved. So far the complexity, uncertainty and danger, even, of light-plane operation has kept it the monopoly of sportsmen or enthusiastic amateurs.

None of these problems is basic. Concerted research work should open the way to the production of a light plane that you or I can operate with the same certainty and with substantially less risk than the present family jalopy. Assuming that only one automobile owner out of five is willing to go on the market for such a plane, that demand should be sufficient to maintain an annual output of about one million light planes.

A pooling of research facilities and personnel through government support for such a project would be out of the normal channel of technological development in American corporate enterprise. But it would bring results. Only through such joint effort could immediate research work be undertaken on an adequate scale without interference with the essential war research and development which are now the primary responsibility of the industry and the government.

Air Passenger and Cargo Transport.—Civilian air travel today is the almost exclusive privilege of the socially, politically or economically elect. In the post-war world this situation can continue only as a direct

result of planned sabotage to air travel. Naturally the same forces which were charged before the Kilgore Committee with choking off the manufacture of streamlined trains in order to keep obsolescent Pullman cars in operation will be hostile toward large-scale, cheap air transport for the average American.

This resistance must be broken down. It is the only barrier to air travel in postwar America for the common man and his family. It can be broken down if pressure from the American people and their elected representatives is brought to bear against the monopoly groups which are responsible for this sabotage of progress. It is by no means visionary to predict that the average American in the future will be able to vacation in California, in Europe or the islands of the Pacific. For improved travel facilities mean not less travel but more—a lesson which even the profit accounts of the transport monopolies should verify.

The same principles apply to air cargo transportation. Here international trade will be decisive. Full interchange of goods and services among all nations will provide a giant stimulus to the expansion of aircraft. Clearly, present rates per ton-mile for air freight have been artificially maintained. Sharp reductions in costs, together with control of corporate price policy, should put air transport within the range of any shipper to whom speedy delivery is a major consideration.

Obviously, likewise, international air transport cannot be advanced on any program of Lucean air imperialism or on arrogant demands for American air bases to girdle the world. The future of international air transport hangs on the future of peaceful and co-operative relations among all nations of the earth.

Labor Relations.—Emerging as a new force in American industry, the aircraft industry should and must create for itself a new pattern of labor relations. An opportunity exists to develop coöperative relationships which can lead to new levels of joint accomplishment. The pattern of corporate hostility to unionism which still scars the automobile industry must not be duplicated in aircraft.

Our union can report already that substantial progress is being made toward this end in wartime. Whether such will continue to be the case when the wartime pressure for manpower and production is lifted, I cannot presume to say. That question of policy will be determined by the powers of the industry.

My frank advice to them, however, is to remember that the entire future of their industry is linked to the force of democratic progress in this country and throughout the world. If they are to profit by such developments they must at the same time give recognition to democracy where it most directly counts—in the plants where the planes are made.

RICHARD T. FRANKENSTEIN

Washington Notes

Veto and Congressional Reaction

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT's successful veto of the anti-subsidy bill may not really settle much. It continues the fight into what may become a still greater snarl. It seems likely that Mr. Roosevelt will also veto the tax bill. Thus you have government by veto, on one hand, contending with government by rider, on the other, in the midst of America's greatest war.

Congress attached the anti-subsidy ban to the Commodity Credit Corporation bill as a legislative rider. Mr. Roosevelt vetoed it. Congress also wrote the social-security freeze into the inadequate tax bill as a legislative rider. Mr. Roosevelt can meet this problem also by veto, which is a negative weapon given to the President in the complicated governmental chess-game set up by the Founding Fathers. But Congress can counter the White House move by writing more "riders" on other bills.

Subsidy-hater Jesse P. Wolcott (R) of Michigan, ranking minority member of the House Banking Committee, will probably now seek to attach the rider to the all-important price-control-continuation bill. Without this bill, price control ends June 30. It is a bill, Congress figures, that the President just can't veto. It is apt to become a catch-all of pressure-group demands. One bloc after another is going to demand favored exemptions. There is the possibility of an old-fashioned tariff log-rolling contest.

From the viewpoint of practical politics, Mr. Roosevelt might just as well take a strong stand now. The issue between Congress and President has come to a showdown. Vetoes dramatize issues if they do nothing else. Mr. Roosevelt can write his fourth-term platform in veto messages. There is little to lose any longer from alienating Congress. It is alienated. There is little chance, I am afraid, of further constructive domestic legislation, save of a non-controversial character, until after November. Washington seems hurrying toward that legislative dead-center of stalemate that often comes in election years. To this moderately detached observer it seems as though Mr. Roosevelt were outplaying his congressional antagonists. But it is a sorry, negative, indecisive game at best.

I felt that perhaps I devoted too much space last week to discussing Senator George's reactionary postwar program. But now comes the big Baruch-Hancock report, which puts the matter in contrast. Baruch wants to demobilize America by executive directives. Chairman George of the Senate Postwar Planning Committee wants to do it under rigid congressional rule. The first puts emphasis on national interest, the second on business interest. Senator George himself recognizes the distinction. His first reaction is to call the two reports "irreconcilable."

I don't feel that any of us should accept a program simply because Senator George is against it, however much that may count. The Baruch report is a constructive, middle-road document that deserves careful reading. The difficulty comes in details. Baruch opposes government sur-

plus plant operation, wants to restore private enterprise, but makes all sorts of qualifications to these goals which George leaves out. And even after these qualifications, I am still left doubting. So much will hinge on the individual instance. Shall the equivalent Muscle Shoals of World War II be handed over to the future Henry Fords, or shall we turn them into new TVA's? I don't see how any rigid line can be drawn, by Mr. Baruch or anybody else. It is only fair to him to say that he recognizes the absolute necessity for flexibility.

The Home Owners' Loan Corporation was the agency created in 1933 to stop the social hemorrhage of home-foreclosures, running at the rate of 1,000 a day when it took over. The HOLC bailed out a million families, with \$3,500,000,000 worth of loans, saved thousands of private loan agencies, salvaged untold human values and expects to wind up its affairs in 1952, if not interfered with, at no cost to the taxpayer. But a powerful banking lobby led by the United States Savings and Loan League wants the HOLC liquidated now. This would mean (1) that the weak loans would be foreclosed by the government, costing the taxpayers \$285,000,000, and (2) that the good loans would be promptly refinanced by private companies, at higher interest rates, with tremendous profits. This modest proposal to plunder the Treasury is advanced as an "economy" measure by Senator Byrd and Representative Dickson and has strong support.

Items of the Week. Bright spot of the week: The New Yorker's decision to be no longer capsuled by The Reader's Digest, on the ground that the latter "is beginning to generate a considerable fraction of the contents of American magazines." . . . A second delegation of three Washington correspondents has gone to Albany and reports: Barkis is willing. Even those hostile to Dewey acknowledge that he has grown since '40, has force, presence and ability; add that he is calculating, egocentric, opportunistic. . . . Sample of reckless economy: House committee action in slashing \$3,000,000 from the State Department budget at the time in all history when America's foreign arm needs strengthening, when Ambassador Winant gets only \$20,000 in contrast to \$80,000 for Lord Halifax, when the much-criticized department lacks even adequate typewriters. . . . Helpful eight-column headline in anti-British, pro-isolationist, Cissie Patterson's Washington Times-Herald at a critical moment of Anzio beachhead fight: "British Quit Beach—Berlin." . . . Poison-minded Chicago Tribune, Dec. 8: "If Harry Hopkins, in his travels, had come across his boy . . . hanging onto an army rifle, he and a lot more Americans could have been proud. Such things, however, do not happen in Mr. Roosevelt's official family." U.P. dispatch, Feb. 12: "The White House tonight confirmed reports that Stephen T. Hopkins, 18, son of Harry Hopkins . . . has been killed in action in the South Pacific." . . . Question rising here in many minds: From what source does the Soviet Union draw news of the USA; whether the hangover from the 25-year persecution makes Tass and Daily Worker correspondents adequate agents for realistic reporting now; whether this factor accounts for inexplicable Soviet attacks on its American friends.

Washington

T. R. B.

The Happiness Boys

AMONG MOVIE-GOERS there is a sect whose members prefix all discussions of films with the statement: "I only go to the movies to be entertained." The statement implies that the rest of us, who are serious about the films, go to them as we would to castor oil. Any appreciation of art is a satisfaction of an emotional need and therefore a pleasure; the people who go to the movies *just* to be entertained are not referring to this pleasure but are implying that the movies aren't art and if taken at all ought to be taken frivolously, and that those who do think the movies are an art go to them in a vain pursuit of nonexistent esthetic values. All the implications of their statement seem to me snobbish and silly.

The main trouble with their proposition is that it actually supposes that a person can consciously leave all of his experience of life and his desire for new experiences behind him when he goes to the movies, and can present to the movie a kind of third-rate part of himself that is interested only in being diverted by what he believes are third-rate representations of life. Short of blind self-deception or a peculiarly affected attitude toward esthetics, I don't know how this can be done. It might be comfortable if one could leave at home when he goes to the movies his convictions of actuality, his instinctive sense of harmony, rhythm, balance and unity, his dislike of the spurious, the academic and the unimportant; that is what Hollywood's press agents might desire most. It's a nice idea, but it won't work, because there is hardly a movie in which at least one person wasn't passionately and earnestly involved in his performance—as soon as you can detect the area of this person's activity neither the press agent nor anyone else can be frivolous with a clear conscience. In spite of which the people who go to the movies just to be entertained defend their kind of movie-going with the statement that the movies today are made with no serious intent. And yet last year movies like "Watch on the Rhine," "The Oxbow Incident," "The Hard Way," "The Moon Is Down," were meant in their entirety to be taken completely seriously no matter how well their aim was achieved—to look at them just to be entertained was to be foolish.

The argument for movies only as entertainment (a less offensive way of saying the movies are a place for slumming) implies that the more seriously one takes the movies, the less pleasurable they become. The serious-minded, though, go to be shown the movie-maker's idea, the best the movie-maker can do with his idea. To be shown anything less than the best is to be given that much less pleasure—unless one is more entertained by artifice and bad performance than by its opposite. To differentiate in movies, as in any art, really enlarges the pleasure to be got from them, whether the movie turns out to be good, bad or indifferent. The bad, in this way, takes on more meaning and definition, and therefore serves a wider purpose. To seek merely entertainment in movies seems to me to be an aim toward misinformation and ignorance rather than toward the avowed aim of pleasure—merely an aim toward not understanding the full context of a movie fact. There are people who don't confuse the qualities of pleasure in Irving Berlin

and Bach; yet meanwhile they are degrading the concept of pleasure in art by lumping all movies, good, bad and indifferent, into a category labeled "something by which to be entertained." The reason for this standardlessness is often that the entertainment-seekers think a good picture is the pretentious idiocy of the so-called serious film which is a slugging match of trick camera angles, heavy shadows, stagnancy, pompous dialogue and deep thinking (for this kind of "art film" see "The Voice in the Wind"): the people who have this kind of movie concept have actually little idea of what a good movie is. A really great movie like "Greed," with the rich exactness of the material it shows in pursuit of its theme, has no relation at all to the "art film" and makes the "entertainment film" seem flimsy and eminently unsatisfying solely on the grounds of pleasure.

I believe that in some quarters the question is still being battled as to whether the movies are art. Battle or no battle, that the movies are an art is a fact: the movies are a medium for human expression and differ from poetry only as poetry differs from painting or from music, in having a different set of technical instruments.

I am not making out a case for every movie as a work of art. I too have heard the Hollywood slogan—"The movies are your best entertainment," and I have seen my share of junk. My case is, however, that if you go to the movies for the diversion offered by an exhibition of junk, Hollywood, in more ways than one, has put something over on you.

MANNY FARBER

A Communication

Africa and the Colonial Problem

SIR: Julian Huxley's excellent statement of the liberal British position regarding colonies [The New Republic, January 24] is especially important because he bases his case primarily on the situation in Africa, where, as you observe, "the problem is tougher than almost anywhere else." This is because these colonies are ordinarily considered the most "backward," most in need of a long training period before their people can be trusted with self-government. The fundamental element in the colonial problem, however, is the *human* element, and the crux of the matter is contained in Mr. Huxley's query, "Freedom for whom?" provided one adds the question, "What kind of freedom?"

I approach the colonial system from what might be termed the worm's-eye view—that of the native peoples who are ruled under it. This point of view I have come in some measure to know as an anthropological field-worker, whose task is to study the ways of life of native peoples in order to obtain data which will be of use in analyzing certain broad questions concerning the varieties of human tradition and the manner in which culture influences human behavior. Because of the method employed in gathering these materials, which above all requires that the investigator refrain from giving subjective evaluations of native behavior, one inevitably hears a great deal, not directly in line with the principal objective, that throws

considerable light on native attitudes toward Europeans. And it is this which, to me, is essential; the reality that, if not fully taken into account, will sooner or later all over the colonial world lead to situations like that in India today, which augurs ill for a lasting peace.

"Freedom for whom?" asks Mr. Huxley. Freedom for all men and women to live their lives in their own ways, and in terms of those ways of life, to govern themselves. Of course, in Kenya they must be protected against Europeans—this is an obligation of western European society that utilized its power to dispossess and demoralize the native folk of the region. But, most certainly, not to "protect" the Nigerian Yoruba, for example, against the "feudal Mohammedan Emirs" to the north, or coastal West African folk in general against a "tiny minority of educated coastal Negroes." For this is the essence of a policy of divide and conquer, used with such success by those earlier imperialisms that Mr. Huxley would, I am sure, be the first to condemn.

When I was in Kano, the seat of one of these Emirates, I had the opportunity to talk with several old men who had been slave-traders, about their contacts with the coast. Their route, which they traced for me, was a long one—far to the west, then south to the Gold Coast, rather than directly south to Lagos, the port of western Nigeria, or southwest to Whydah, the port of Dahomey. "The donkey doesn't go there," was the imagery of the reply to my question, which indicated that the Yoruba could very well take care of themselves. And later, in Dahomey, I remember a native's grimace of distaste as he saw a Hausa trader from Kano, and his remark, "He wouldn't have stayed here long in the days of our freedom."

What of the "small minority of educated Coast Negroes?" The analogy of Liberia is not fairly drawn, for from the point of view of the Liberian tribesman, rule by Americo-Liberians is as foreign as any other rule. To the Krumen, the fact that those who rule him are of Negro descent means nothing. Mr. Huxley's thinking is akin to that of those American officials who sent Negro troops to African posts on the ground that they were best fitted to serve there, that they would be better received than white troops! Africans do not think racially. They do not make evaluations on the basis of skin-color. They think in tribal terms, and coastal Negroes who are "educated" are none the less still members of the tribal groups into which they were born—better members, I may add from my knowledge of them, than Mr. Huxley implies, and certainly better than they would allow any member of a foreign ruling group to realize.

But let us suppose that Mr. Huxley's proposed program of broadening the colonial educational system—that is, of giving natives European education, for they have their own types quite well suited to their own needs—were carried out. Who, other than the best educated group, inevitably a minority, and probably a tiny one, would command the resources necessary to wield power? It is not necessary to know much of West Africa to realize that those who would benefit the most by this education would be sons and nephews of native chiefs, just as it is these who to the present have received what has been available of it. West African cultures are based on social and political and economic stratification, and it is to be doubted whether any amount

of "education" from the outside will change this. Only inner drives, over a long period of time, would seem to be able to effectuate so radical a change in these deeply set patterns of relationships.

Thus Mr. Huxley's position, enlightened though it is, leaves to one side the element we have noted as essential, the freedom of a people to follow their daily round as may seem best to themselves. His very manner of expression indicates how unconsciously he draws invidious judgments, as when he speaks of Nigerian tribesmen "living in a primitive stage of paganism, subsisting by a primitive agriculture," or of British West Africa on the whole as "a subcontinent that had remained for the most part in an early stage of barbarism." Yet these are the people who, after cocoa-growing had been introduced into the Gold Coast at the turn of the century, organized coöperatives to permit them to cope with the rigors of the world market. Evaluations such as Mr. Huxley makes in the phrases I have cited are really evaluations in terms of *our* culture, and imply by their very use a belief in a graded series of whole cultures, a belief which leads to the position that we alone know what is good for the lesser-cultured natives.

I grant the practical difficulties of integrating native cultures of varied degrees of complexity into a world political and economic system. I realize the responsibility of all countries toward this system—especially the responsibility of the United States—and I hope we shall assume the burdens our obligations entail. But even a united effort will but breed deeper and deeper resentments among colonial peoples everywhere, I am convinced, if the world order operates on the psychological base of the colonial system, which holds that those who have the power given by the machine and the rifle possess the wisdom to dictate ways of life to those who do not possess these. The essence of freedom is being free, and no man is free whose life is lived at the pleasure of an outsider, however liberal, well intentioned and friendly he may be. Obligations to "do good" may be assumed with the highest sense of duty, but when they are unilaterally assumed, they are seldom recognized by those who are "done good to," even though the recipients, on occasion, be consulted.

MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS

Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.

The Bandwagon

If history remembers him [Vice President Wallace] at all, it will be as the man who killed the little pigs and ignorantly and brazenly asked the American people not to double-cross Russia. — *From an editorial in The Seattle Times.*

HIGHER BED SHEET CEILINGS TO STIMULATE

PRODUCTION AT LOWER END, SAYS OPA

— *Headline in The Philadelphia Record.*

Should President Roosevelt announce that he has determined to eliminate himself as a possible candidate for the presidency he would immediately restore domestic tranquility, encourage social responsibility, inspire personal initiative, promote the gen-

eral welfare and greatly quicken every noble impulse in all Americans. — *A letter in The Chicago Tribune.*

Brave New World

Like all nations, Mexico has her weaknesses, her drawbacks and imperfections. But today Mexico is going ahead. A nation which can in the field of small arms alone design and produce Mendoza guns, Mauser rifles and ammunition can and will rise rapidly to a greater destiny—the destiny of All-America. — *From The American Rifleman Magazine.*

By Any Other Name

When it became known that the school planned to stage the operetta ["The Mikado"], the Daughters of the American Revolution and other patriotic groups protested.

An offer to change the line, "We the gentlemen of Japan,"

to "We, the scoundrels of Japan," failed to quiet the protests. — *UP dispatch from Uniontown, Pennsylvania.*

On the Home Front

Give yourself a Christmas gift—you deserve it after the long round of holiday shopping, menu planning, reducing yourself to a mere shadow for family and friends. Give yourself a new lipstick—something that everybody else concerned has passed over as too obvious. Put it in the toe of your stocking with a card, "Love to myself from me." — *Sara Sutton in The New York Herald Tribune.*

Our readers are invited to contribute to this column; \$1 will be paid for each item used. Address Bandwagon, care of The New Republic. Please enclose the original clipping. — THE EDITORS

Correspondence

He Was There

SIR: My comments, like your issues, tend to lag behind the calendar for various reasons. On the other hand I have the advantage of reading large gobs of the magazine at once. Your October 25 issue is little less than splendid. Every essay was good.

But I don't write to say that. I write to say, as one who has been in Africa twice—last March through April, and this November—and as one who while there took the trouble to look around. Jay Allen has the dope ["Two Views of North Africa," October 25]. He really knows what happened. He is the only person to point out that Noguès fought with everything he had in Morocco—which was supposed to be where the great deals saved us so much. If we got Algeria it was by surprise and effort, the whole kaboodle of Darlan and Giraud, etc., being on our side was a pretty unfunny joke. The only people willing to help us were de Gaullists; the remainder were and *still are* our enemies, though by now they no longer blatantly proclaim it in their newspapers as they were doing in March—three months after their "liberation."

Why, then, you should publish the blurb by "Gallicus," translated by the usually sharp apple Malcolm Cowley, I can't understand. It repeats the same old [stuff] about the great deals and wonderful maneuvering and how important it all was, when everybody below the rank of admiral knows that people kept shooting at them for a long time in Africa while the war correspondents wrote "history" and the inside story of Mark Clark losing his pants—a great symbolic story.

Fleet P. O., N. Y.

SIMPLICISSIMUS

Austria's Future

SIR: Mr. Heinz H. F. Eulau has criticized the Moscow Declaration on Austria in his recent article (The New Republic, January 24) on account of its vagueness. His points are well taken, but Mr. Eulau, too, evades the cardinal question: Will the Austrian people be allowed a voice in determining Austria's future? Will they enjoy the right of self-determination? This right would include the right of voting on the union with Germany. If we are not willing to give that right, in other words, if we propose to resurrect and perpetuate one of the most fateful restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, we should say so.

To make international politics by implication is a dangerous and certainly not a democratic procedure. However, in this case

the implication was accepted almost everywhere. Mr. Eulau does not discuss any solution other than the inclusion of an independent Austria in a "Soviet-integrated central and south-eastern Europe." How does he know that this is what the Austrians want? Are we not going to ask them? For anyone acquainted with the problem, the Austrian people's right to independence is reminiscent of the famous privilege of the poor to sleep under bridges. Austria is too weak for independence, politically as well as economically, and what is more, the Austrian people know it.

In 1919 independence was *imposed* by the Western Powers despite an overwhelming vote in favor of the Anschluss in the new, democratically elected Austrian Parliament. But in 1938, when there was every reason to prevent it, the same powers let Hitler force the Anschluss upon an unwilling Austrian people. For the Austrian people would have voted against a union with Nazi Germany if a terror-free plebiscite had been held. If after this war independence is again to be imposed upon Austria, one might well ask: Is it because we have given up hope of a democratic Germany? Americans generally seem to believe that those "nice Austrians" would want nothing better than to be liberated from those "barbaric Prussians." Yet, the cliché of the charming Austrian is as dangerous a half-truth as the generalization that makes every Prussian a villain. The Viennese waltzes and Prussian militarism are realities, but there are these facts also: Hitler is an Austrian, not a Prussian; it was in his own country that he was infected with a traditional anti-Semitism which overshadowed anything of the kind practised in Germany; Prussia under the Weimar Republic was the most progressive of the German states and the one which withstood the poison of Nazism for the longest time.

This writer has lived for many years in both Germany and Austria, and his experience leaves no doubt that the union of the two countries is desired on both sides. For cultural as well as economic reasons, the Anschluss is the only genuine solution of the Austrian problem, the only one which can be expected to last. It is true that after the war we must be prepared to find that six years of the Nazi regime have created intense anti-German feelings in Austria. The Austrians would be only human if they tried to conceive of Nazism as a purely German affair and to forget that their native Nazis were as numerous and as vicious as the German species. If discriminatory and crippling peace conditions are enjoined upon Germany, this line of thinking will become even more attractive to the Aus-

trians. But we may trust that the combination of resentment and opportunism will not unmake the history of many centuries. The bonds of kinship, tradition and economic interrelation which connect Austria with Germany will remain as strong as they ever were. And all the proposals to "integrate" Austria with other neighboring countries are manifestly and hopelessly artificial.

The separation of Austria from Germany can be rationalized only if we plan to build a *cordon sanitaire* around Germany. There are many indications that we are actually moving in that direction. Our leaders apparently hold little hope for the emergence of a truly democratic Germany and want to use Austria against Germany as a pawn in the game of power politics. Felix Austria . . . ?

Chicago, Ill.

WALTER W. MARSEILLE

SIR: I agree with Mr. Marseille's position that union of a democratic Austria with a democratic Germany is the best possible solution of the Austrian problem, provided this democratic Greater Germany is integrated politically and economically in a European, or at least an eastern European, security system. But one factor Mr. Marseille certainly overlooks, namely, that the Austrian people in a democratic plebiscite may prefer independence from Germany. I admit that we know little about what Austrians are thinking right now. However, from what we do know it appears that anti-German sentiment has considerably increased in the war years. This is also the observation of a neutral newspaperman, Arvid Fredborg, in his book, "Behind the Steel Wall."

New York City

HEINZ H. F. EULAU

Garden-City Planning

SIR: Messrs. Percival and Paul Goodman, in their comments on my criticism of their article [The New Republic, January 10], have not answered my specific criticism: namely, that they recklessly and erroneously labeled as examples of "garden-city planning" what were actually examples of bad open planning: an amorphous suburbanism. For committing this confusion, they owe an apology to the memory of Sir Ebenezer Howard, the founder of the garden-cities movement.

In their justification Messrs. Goodman have not retracted their error but added a few new ones for good measure. First: they say that they were far from adversely criticizing "the Letchworth plan of Ebenezer Howard." Unfortunately for this admission, Howard never made any plan of Letchworth: what he contributed to it was an abstract diagram setting forth its principles. These principles Messrs. Goodman now, forty-six years after the publication of Howard's "Garden Cities of Tomorrow," are attempting to claim, apparently, as their own peculiar discovery.

From their criticism of the open, inorganic plans that have been made by public agencies which the Messrs. Goodman properly criticized, I naturally inferred that what they objected to in garden-city planning was its openness: the only feature it has in common with the bad examples they mischievously called garden-city planning in America. If I am wrong, I should like to have them state in what essential manner their notion of integration differs from Howard's.

To judge by their attack on my own position, the Messrs. Goodman's tactics are to disparage anyone else who holds ideas similar to those they stand for. When the Messrs. Goodman say that they believe in an integration of the day's life not grounded in the separation of work and culture, and that they mean a simplification of life not attained by adding complexity, they are accepting the fundamental premises of my own thought on cities.

On one point alone do I differ seriously from the Messrs.

Goodman's plea for integration: on the notion that it may be based upon "a city square on which homes, public buildings, factories and markets all open out." That is not integration but muddle: would they include blast furnaces and slaughterhouses in this urban grouping? If they are really serious in their proposal to integrate agriculture and industry, country and town, by what strange process of thought do they achieve that integration on a city square?

Stanford University, Calif.

LEWIS MUMFORD

SIR: 1. Howard's "abstract diagram" is just what we would call a social plan. Obviously in a discussion of this kind we are not concerned with technical plans or working-drawings.

2. Far from attempting to steal famous ideas 50 years old, we consider ourselves to be in the tradition of Soria y Mata and Howard. Our difference from Howard is not that his plan is not integral, but (to repeat!) that it is not so closely integrated as modern conditions allow. By "more closely integrated" we mean: dividing factories into smaller units throughout the community, the reemergence of small-shop and even domestic production, the elimination of the schizoid nature of the modern work-leisure attitude, the introduction of cultural criteria into industry and into the choice and location of industries, etc.

3. The open plan of 12 families to the acre is neither city nor country. It deprives the city of compactness and walkability without giving it agriculture. It makes the country inaccessible to the city man; it adds to the distance that dairy and truck produce must be transported; and it diminishes the country area (which in England, the home of the garden city, has become a crucial problem, as Thomas Sharp has pointed out). The integration of city and country cannot possibly depend on destroying the functions of both. Wright's Broadacres is better than this, for there at least a man has an acre. But how we propose to integrate town and country is a long and different story. For instance, from the point of view of population and density alone, by combining a town-density of 50 families to the acre with intensively cultivated small farms of one family to 4 acres (plus an outer band of extensive agriculture), we provide for an almost self-subsistent community of 300,000 persons within a radius of 7 miles.

4. We should call the commuter's use of a motor car or other vehicle an "added complexity." We should call the increased miles of services and utilities in the open plan an "added complexity."

5. With few exceptions, modern factories are nuisances only when they inefficiently fail to reclaim their waste. (By the way, blast-furnaces and slaughterhouses are not factories.) Certainly we should plan an assembly-plant between a hotel and a library. Why is this a muddle? Is the work undignified or uncultural? Is it unreasonable to locate it conveniently to the home and to literature? Perhaps a school might be in the factory. If the work is integral in the culture, should not this be expressed by art?

New York City

PERCIVAL and PAUL GOODMAN

From The New Republic Mail Bag

Lidell Peck, of Oakland, California, writes us about Warren Atherton, Commander of the American Legion. He says that Californians, who know Atherton to be a reactionary, find his present campaign to attract new recruits to the Legion by making statements for mustering-out pay very strange when he remains quiet—so far as Mr. Peck knows—on the subject of getting the soldiers a vote.

We were favorably impressed by the first issue of The Maryland Quarterly, published at the University of Maryland. The issue contains prose and poetry from Britain, France and many other countries as well as the United States.

Books in Review

The Assassinated Poet

THE SILENCE OF THE SEA¹ is a little book, hardly more than a short story, that gains much of its interest from the circumstances surrounding its writing and publication. The author, who signs himself Vercors, is still in France; if his real name were known, he would be sentenced to death, along with the other Frenchmen who printed the book or helped in its distribution. The original edition carried a brief notice on the title page: "Editions de Minuit. This volume, published at the personal expense of a patriot, came from the press on February 20, 1942, under the Nazi occupation." It was dedicated to the memory of Saint-Pol-Roux, *poète assassiné*. Later the story was reprinted in London, and thousands of copies were scattered over France by the Royal Air Corps. The present translation, an extremely good one, was made by Cyril Connolly.

After all these preliminaries, the story itself seems a little unflavored and wholesome, like a cup of cocoa when you had been expecting wine. A German officer has been billeted in a French country house, where he shows himself eager to be liked by the owner (who tells the story) and falls in love with the owner's niece. He was a composer in civilian life and a student of French literature; he wants to think that the two countries can now live at peace. Every day he pays a visit to his unwilling French hosts; every day he tells them about his boyhood or delivers a friendly lecture on the future; but the owner and his niece remain obdurately silent. Then, during a visit to his colleagues in Paris, he learns that the France he loves is to be destroyed, economically and morally. "There is no hope," he tells his hosts, before leaving for the eastern front. And the niece speaks to him for the first time: "Adieu," she whispers, as if saying farewell to the old Germany of music and scholarship; henceforth there will be nothing but hatred between the two nations.

The story seems to have had an overwhelming effect on its French readers. This was partly because it appeared during a prolonged moral crisis, the nature of which is still misunderstood in this country; particularly we fail to realize that the crisis has now ended. But in 1940, when France was overrun by the Germans, even her best citizens were plunged into a state of lethargic despair. They suffered much less from the sense of military defeat than from the feeling that their nation had deserved nothing better, being so divided by internal conflicts—as Gide wrote in his *Journal*—and so given over to private selfishness and political corruption that it was scarcely fit for self-government; they asked themselves whether the Nazi invasion might not be a deserved retribution and even a promise for the future. At this period, the Nazis succeeded in making a number of converts among the artists and writers. One of these was Drieu la Rochelle, who had German support when he took

over the NRF, formerly the best of the literary journals. There were distinguished names in the first issues that appeared under his editorship. A year later, however, he was forced to confess that "Almost all the intellect, almost all the poetic spirit of France, are against us."

Something had happened in the meantime: a rebirth of patriotism, a *redressement*, a stiffening of the backbone. In some of the books that have reached us from France, we can note the exact moment of change: with Aragon, for example, it happened one morning in August, 1940, when he heard an old French ballad "troubling," as he said, "the green pool of silence." With André Gide, always refractory and counter-suggestive, it was reading a book by a collaborationist author, Chardonne, that made him realize the depths of self-delusion (and bad writing) into which some of his colleagues were sinking. With Vercors, whoever he may be, it was the moment when the German officer pointed to his bookshelves and said that the Nazis proposed to extirpate French culture—"Not only your modern writers! Not only your Péguy, your Proust, your Bergson. . . . But all the others! All those up there! The whole lot!"

For still other Frenchmen, the critical incident was the death of the poet to whom this little book is dedicated. It is a story worth telling at some length.


Before the First World War, visitors to the seacoast village of Camaret, in Brittany, were sure to notice a strange building with two round towers that gave it the look of a Spanish castle reproduced in cardboard on the stage. If they lingered in front of it, the owner himself might emerge and bow deeply. "I am Saint-Pol-Roux the poet. This," he would say with a wave of his hand, "this is my manor house. Might I ask you in for a glass of vermouth?" Some of his casual visitors stayed for dinner, stayed for charades or a pantomime and emerged late at night, aching with laughter and perhaps a little in love with the poet's wife; she had been the leading lady of "Louise," after spending her youth in the streets of Montmartre. Saint-Pol-Roux had written the book of "Louise," but under a pseudonym, having too great respect for the profession of poet to let his name appear on the playbill of a light opera. Nevertheless he lived for years on the money it earned; and when funds ran short he wrote begging letters to the crowned heads of Europe, telling them that it was their duty as monarchs to keep a gifted poet from starving. Some of these letters were answered with gifts.

The story begins to sound like something written by Leonard Merrick, all Latin laughter and bohemian recklessness (and a little cheap in the bargain); but it had a beginning and a sequel that were in a different key. Saint-Pol-Roux, born in 1861 and married in middle life, had once been known in Paris as the Magnificent; that was because of his splendid costumes and his torrential speeches. He was a leader among the Symbolist poets of the 1890's, a disciple of Mallarmé, a friend of Gauguin and a leader admired by dozens of the younger writers. His poems appeared in all the little reviews, all the anthologies, and they


¹ The Silence of the Sea, by Vercors. New York: The Macmillan Company. 61 pages. \$1. (In French: Les Silences de la Mer. New York: J. Schiffrin and Company. 68 pages. \$1.)

One of the greatest heroic exploits of the war—told in full for the first time

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
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**NOW I
LAY ME
DOWN TO
SLEEP**



had been honored with a chapter in Remy de Gourmont's "Book of Masks." About this time, he wrote his masterpiece, "La Dame à la Faulx," an extravagantly poetic drama of real distinction which, for a wonder, was all but accepted by the Comédie Française. Later the great director Antoine wanted to have it read at one of his Saturday mornings at the Odéon, but the offer was refused. "I will not come in by the servants' entrance," said Saint-Pol-the-Magnificent.

He retired to the coast of Brittany, where he built his manor house and where, after a time, he was almost forgotten. He could find not even a publisher, let alone a producer, for his new poetic dramas. He ceased to appear in anthologies or be mentioned by the critics. It seemed that he had entered the realm of the *poètes manqués*, the vast cemetery where failures are buried alive. And he had private as well as professional sorrows: his wife died young; his favorite son, Cécilian, was killed in Belgium during the war; his savings were wiped out in the postwar inflation. For years this poet who loved good company was left alone in his cardboard manor, with only his youngest child, a daughter named Divine, and a usually unpaid but faithful servant. Then, in the 1930's, Saint-Pol-Roux was discovered by the Surrealists, who began reprinting his work, after saluting him as their ancestor and a genius unsurpassed in modern French poetry. He became the center of a cult that he was now too told to enjoy.

And his life was destined to take one more strange turn, as a result of the invasion. On the night of June 23-24, 1940, a little band of German soldiers broke into the manor, looking for wine or loot. It wasn't an episode typical of the German occupation, which began by being "very correct," as the French said among themselves; but every invading army has its drunken soldiers. The poet, who expected everybody to obey him, brandished his cane and ordered them out of the house. Rose, the servant woman, flung herself in front of him and the shot killed her. The poet was untouched, but fragile with age, and he fell to the floor with an apoplectic stroke. What followed was a scene of grotesque horror that Goya might have drawn. One of the soldiers attacked Divine. There were more drunken pistol shots and a bullet shattered her knee. When the Germans went out, she crawled into the garden to scream for help, but nobody came because of the curfew and she lay there all night in the rain. Next morning Divine and her father were taken to the hospital, where the poet died.

Her story spread through the Occupied Zone by word of mouth, although it was also mentioned guardedly in several French and Swiss magazines. Fontaine, published in Algiers, said in November, 1940, that the poet's death was the result "of recent events which, we hope at least, can some day be revealed." It revealed them in April, 1943, after the American occupation. By that time, however, they were known all over France. And the result was that Saint-Pol-Roux, who believed in the divine right of kings and poets, who was completely indifferent to politics and had even withdrawn from literary life, retiring to the last promontory in the Atlantic, became a political symbol and, by his death, helped to create a new spirit in the French nation.

MALCOLM COWLEY

Exotics

Liana, by Martha Gellhorn. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 285 pages. \$2.50.

Liberty Street, by I. V. Morris. New York: Harper and Brothers. 280 pages. \$2.50.

Now I Lay Me Down to Sleep, by Ludwig Bemelmans. New York: The Viking Press. 299 pages. \$2.50.


Mahogany, by Alfredo Segre. New York: L. B. Fischer. 286 pages. \$2.75.

THE VENERABLE DEVICE of isolating characters in scenes unfamiliar to them or to the reader always risks the substitution of gothic titillation for imaginative effort. In "Liberty Street," for example, the tropical setting enables the author to add an unlikely armadillo to other quaint quackeries, and to drop an expanse of intense blue sea behind his lovers. In "Liana," more purposefully, it provides an origin for a natural woman and a moderate symbol for moral choice, but it functions mainly as gaudy decor. In "Now I Lay Me Down to Sleep," which is comic, operatic and extravagant, it is an exact reflection of the characters and their motives, but, even though it produces the catastrophe, a reflection still. In "Mahogany" alone is the landscape throughout as integral to the drama as the characters, a charged symbol of the desperate choices forced upon men.

Both "Liana" and "Liberty Street" are set in the Caribbean and pivot on situations provided by contemporary politics. Both, too, are strangled by triteness—the first, of materials, the second, of execution. It is as if Miss Gellhorn, who is a sober and skillful rather than a powerful novelist, challenged herself to bring to life the most worn materials of cheap fiction: a beautiful native girl in a lush tropical setting, a brutal white man to whom she is tied, a beautiful and sensitive white man who is hired to teach her and who is promptly gripped by the conflict of love and honor. In 1944, the beautiful and sensitive white man is, of course, sensitive to fascism; specifically, this one is a Frenchman who has fled Vichy and determines to return to fight Vichy, a sound and obvious conclusion which leaves Liana in the familiar dilemma of Madame Butterfly, played this time by Dotty Lamour to the tune of "Shoo Shoo, Baby." Miss Gellhorn is pitiless: she does not hesitate to include even the heroine's heartbroken letter which, by misrepresenting her true feelings, releases the hero from his scruples about her. Where she breaks sharply with her trite materials is in the handling of the relationship between the two men: they come to understand, almost to love, each other, and Liana is faced with utter exclusion. This is a delicate psychological situation which Conrad, for example, would have developed with circumspection; but most of Miss Gellhorn's novel is devoted to blackening her villain, and her last chapters hardly give him time to take off his mustache.

"Liberty Street" tries its heavy hand at very fresh and important material which may provide a brilliant and genuinely political novel in this decade: the conflict between democratic and anti-democratic elements in our State Department. Mr. Morris attempts to dramatize this conflict through the efforts of a group of refugees, mainly a

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Viennese family, to get visas from a Caribbean island where they are stranded; but his handling is about as apt, on the level of fiction, as it would be apt, on the level of diplomacy, to send William Saroyan out to head up an embassy somewhere because Mr. Saroyan is so nice. The abstract values (love and kindness) and the oversimplification of motives characteristic of Saroyan are outrageously inappropriate to this material, and manage only to produce the most unlikely child in fiction since "The Human Comedy," if not since "Uncle Tom's Cabin." "Liberty Street" is a good example of the kind of sentimental, "affirmative" eye-wash about human nature which is so devastating to both style and meaning. "Marie-Té felt stirring within her that old spirit of flirtation that was an integral part of her Viennese nature." ". . . her very presence sharpened the rapier of his wit" (the kind of wit one is never allowed to hear). And for this year's triumph of bathos: "Though his blood was pounding in spasms of desire, the heart which pumped it had already died. A cold flaccid object lay in the spot where for thirty-five years a living heart had been beating. . . . Siegfried lifted his hand and laid it on his breast, as if to warm that poor dead object that had abandoned its functions. A futile gesture." End of chapter. One need not inquire, I think, how sensitive Mr. Morris is to his situations if he can be so brutal to his prose. Political piety is predictable, but good will has never yet saved a miserable novel.

"Now I Lay Me Down to Sleep" and "Mahogany" are tropical birds of another feather. Bemelmans, like Thurber, has his own brand of wit and wisdom, and his baroque comedy, again like Thurber's, although Thurber's is bleak, is genuine because its very extravagance pushes it almost into the fabulous. (Saroyan should take a lesson: oversimplification makes foolishness, not fables.) Bemelmans' new novel is more entertaining than anything that has appeared in a long time. His hero, General Leonidas Erosa, a virile South American septuagenarian, epileptic and many times a millionaire, is driven from his rococo villa in Biarritz by the approach of the Nazis. He decides to return to his native establishment in the jungles of Ecuador, and proceeds by way of Casablanca and New York. With him goes an antic entourage of eccentric characters. I do not want to push Mr. Bemelmans into the position of economic moralist, and yet it seems impossible to read his novel as anything but a brilliant extravaganza on the theme of Conspicuous Waste. To that theme he contributes a fitting end, suggestive of Biblical retribution, when nature itself arises to destroy Erosa and all his works, sparing only the old woman who prepared for death, the foolish Indian, Anselmo, who feared nothing, and Erosa's illegitimate infant which Anselmo will raise as an Indian. Anselmo, now that Erosa's prestige has devolved on him, "had become a man of greatest importance. . . . He drew roosters in the sand, and at times he took a piece of paper and some chalk and gave the impression of writing. And he was determined to teach all this to his son." This is the International Novel thirty years later, comic, inverted, gone mad, perhaps, and the heiress of all the ages is Señora Lopez, "the Beauty," who wears an ankle chain and calls her ancient lover "Swit-hart."

"Mahogany" is an international novel in a different sense. It is set in the mahogany jungles of French West Africa where Silva, a European, struggles against all the

hazards of an abominable nature and of the most hideous diseases and of hostile, crippled men, only to be defeated by an agent so remote from his own energy and enterprise as finance capitalism. Again, one must not push the economic meaning here, for the merit of the novel lies in the quality of its feeling, not in the discussion of ideas. In its acrid, intense, eruptive moods, it suggests Malaquais' "Les Javanais" more than any other recent novel, and it has no more to say about economics than Malaquais had in describing his dispossessed; but that no more, in a novel of this sort, is both everything and nothing. The economic fact is just as clearly in the situation as the jungle is, and as Silva is in the jungle. "Mahogany" avoids, therefore, the kind of ambiguousness which besets "Now I Lay Me Down to Sleep," for Bemelmans, who is as much in love with his meaningless extravagance as he is revolted by it, assiduously excludes ideas altogether. On the other hand, it avoids the kind of talky-talk right-mindedness of Morris and the somewhat ill fitting liberalism even of Miss Gellhorn; both seem to impose intellectual patterns on their situations. Thus Segre alone of these novelists explores his situation—and for all it is worth—on the level that counts in fiction, the situation in and for itself, and of these four his novel alone may, in a world of blurbs, be brought honestly to the attention of readers as powerful.

MARK SCHORER

Man from Nowhere

Jean Malaquais' War Diary. Translated from the French by Peter Grant. New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company. 246 pages. \$2.75.

I SHOULD LIKE TO SAY what I must about Jean Malaquais' war diary with the humility owing to a man who has been through hell. I do not know who, faced with his hardships, would have reacted differently, nor do I suppose there are many writers alive today who could remain artists when, in addition to the common misery of war, they had to bear the further burden of exhausting concrete-construction work in the company of unmitigated bores. But for all that, a man is on his own. He may not be able to control what experience shall make of him, but for the attitude with which he approaches experience, the complete man who exists before shock tears him apart, he is completely responsible.

Jean Malaquais went to war the way almost everybody goes to war—none too eagerly. The suffering he bore, the discomfort, annoyance, fatigue and boredom that he felt, are universal, known to all soldiers. Nevertheless, the diary that he kept during his term of service with the French army, from the outbreak to the collapse, is, for the most part, a curiously inappropriate and inadequate, an almost too individual, commentary on war. It is as if the author of "Men from Nowhere," taking the surreptitiously public view of private life to which writers are prone, had said, "let's see what Jean Malaquais has to say about this affair." And thus, throughout at least the first half of his diary, there is a constant fluctuation between writer and man. Hell breaks loose; Malaquais puts it down in his diary—and adds, I am right here on the spot, recording this. The writer's self-conscious promotion of the man, his re-

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iteration that the man is in full attendance, makes you feel that the man is, somehow, a little remote from it all.

"War Diary," however, is more than a record of the incidental agonies of war. It is also a self-portrait and a political document. Malaquais' political opinions are, of course, independent of the particular traits of his character. But what is true of his character is true also of his beliefs: in each the man and his failings are contained.

"The majority of the unfavorable judgments which I form about people," writes Malaquais, "have to do almost exclusively with their intelligence, rarely with their heart." This statement gives the key or feeling-tone in which the diary is written. But I take it for more than that. I also regard it as one of those outcroppings of character, hard and definite, that reveal something of the substance of a man. Other passages, such as, "... the men with whom I am forced to live. God how I despise them! And how, through them, I despise myself!" acquire deeper meaning, even losing some of their fastidious exasperation, in view of the unsparing things he says about himself. In spite of which he still indulges himself, as one need only read "Men from Nowhere" or the theory of art he sets forth in the diary, to discover.

It is obvious that he is a writer of predominantly intellectual temperament (regardless of his intellectual development, which is not exceptionally high or abstract). But more important than the kind of temperament Malaquais may happen to have, is the fact that this temperament is limited by a peculiarly intellectual failing—mind's failure to understand the heart. The irrationalist tradition to the contrary, this the mind is capable of doing. Witness Dostoevsky in Siberia, the pages of "The House of the Dead." But Malaquais is dealing with phenomena that need, perhaps, less to be understood than fused. It is the artist's task to fuse, to bring together the human and the animal in man, to make an imaginative synthesis of what society has dismembered. Of course, among soldiers, "dead men on leave," there are bound to be brutes and morons. But the observation of human degradation is itself a kind of blindness in the writer if it does no more than emphasize his sense of aloofness. Malaquais' aloofness (which differs from the detachment a writer must school himself to achieve) betrays a basic lack of energy, a fatigued impulse deflected from art to a finicky preoccupation with the wounds of the ego.

But for all the vacant areas that the war has blasted in his soul, Malaquais is still equal to depicting the climax of all hopelessness, the fall of France. In passages that are at last free of self-indulgence, he records the futile, disorderly resistance and the disorderly retreat, gathering momentum, dragging a whole world after it. I hope it is not heartless to say that it is not until he reaches the abyss, the greater image of the death which has been growing in him, that Malaquais feels at home; not until then does he become the representative figure he could not be through sensibility alone, the man whose suffering is related to his time.

His political opinions—and this may be said for his sincerity—are of a pattern with his personal cut. He had enough sense of history to know what was required by the times. The war, he knew, would not end by Christmas: destruction was in the air; spring would bring it on. He

saw the world "slowly rolling toward the abyss," and had no hope in the outcome. But he dissociated himself from this world "completely, absolutely, without reservation."

This withdrawal may have been politically motivated, but the withdrawal supersedes the politics. He does not, like a Marxist, go to the Third Camp—there is no more Third Camp. The real enemy is fascism, but the enemy is everywhere, and Hitler is but the perfect exponent, the epitome of the bourgeois world. I do not know anything about Malaquais' political past—but he need not have had any at all. It is because so many of the radicals in Malaquais' position—"oriented" but lost—are Marxists who have abandoned their faith, that the faithful attribute disorder to the defection from Marxism, while the skeptics attribute it to the original mistake of holding the Marxist position. All of which is error as far as Malaquais is concerned, for it is not so much a position as an idealism, belief itself, the capacity for life, that he has lost.

No, politics is life, after all, and whatever a man write about—his opinions, his comrades, his boredom, his fear—he risks the same defeat: the defeat of not knowing what there is to defend. That is the real loss: that out of this war there should come so great a forgetting among the very men—the artists—who, in the face of death, could always distinguish themselves by their own, peculiar bravery: the knowledge of what life is.

ISAAC ROSENFELD

In Re: Germany

What to Do with Germany, by Louis Nizer. Chicago: Ziff-Davis Publishing Company. 213 pages. \$2.50.

Germany Will Try It Again, by Sigrid Schultz. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock. 238 pages. \$2.50.

Germany: To Be or Not to Be? by Gerhart H. Seger and Siegfried K. Marck. New York: The Rand School Press. 190 pages. \$2.

Germany After Hitler, by Paul Hogen. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc. 240 pages. \$2.

Bread and Democracy in Germany, by Alexander Gerschenkron. Berkeley: University of California Press. 238 pages. \$2.75.

Behind the Steel Wall, by Arvid Fredborg. New York: The Viking Press. 305 pages. \$3.

AS THE RISING TIDE of "what to do with Germany" books inundates the market, some plain talking seems appropriate. I do not want to discourage lively debate on such an important problem as the future of Germany. But when this debate sinks to the low level of irresponsible sensationalism, special pleading and deliberate obscurantism, it is high time to put a halt to the nonsense. Of the six books under review here, at least three capitalize on the ignorance of the reading public.

Mr. Nizer's book is a determined, but feeble effort to "out-Vansittart" Lord Vansittart. I hold no brief for Nazi bestialities. I do not apologize for the failure of German democrats to stop Hitler and his cohorts. Vansittartism's indictment of a whole people is, at its worst, Nazi brutality in reverse. At its best, it is perverted social science, for the cure of Germany's social maladies depends on the accuracy of the diagnosis. Mr. Nizer tries to prove that

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
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Nazism is not an economically, socially and historically determined phenomenon, but an inherent characteristic of the German people, and he "succeeds" in "proving" his point by using all the tricks of legalistic pettifoggery, selectively quoting out of context whenever it suits his purpose and nonchalantly forgetting about Germany's highly intricate social and political history.

Miss Schultz, the publisher tells us, lived in Germany for many years, knows the country well, and simply *had* to write her book. Germany, she says, "will try it again." But the only evidence she produces is the fateful course of events in postwar Germany, leading up to the Nazi conquest of power. It is a rather boring account of what is generally known about the anti-democratic scheming of the German reactionaries—militarists, capitalists, landowners, chauvinists—and it is fragmentary at that. Miss Schultz's sensational review of reactionary scheming may make hot reading for our gullible public, but does she *know* Germany? Germany, she claims, did not pay reparations because the money was spent on secret rearmament. Money *was* spent for this purpose, but a responsible journalist would also report that the problem of German reparations was not just a matter of bad faith and unwillingness to pay, but primarily the inability to transfer German marks into foreign currency. To understand the reparations problem one need not know Germany, but one has to know economics.

Lest I be accused of being partial to those who oppose Vansittartism, let me say that the justification of Seger and Marck for the existence of a liberal and democratic "other Germany" are as undynamic and socially empty as the vituperations of the Vansittartists. Their book is a nostalgic cry for the good old days of the Weimar Republic when, it is true, Social-Democratic functionaries did a fine administrative job, but finally turned the state machinery over to the Nazis without the slightest effort to resist—by force. Let us undo the evil works of Nazism, the authors say in effect, and return to where we left off in the early thirties. That the authors are still fighting the Communists—who have their own share of responsibility for the fall of the Republic—only proves that some German political refugees have learned nothing in exile.

These three books suffer from the same basic error. It is an error of method, or rather the lack of a method for anticipating what is likely to happen. They argue their specific cases by selective and deductive reasoning from the past. But historical thinking, if not given social direction, is essentially undynamic, unless the past is understood in terms of meaningful concepts which make contingent thinking possible. I find this kind of thinking in Paul Hagen's book. Its central theme is that only democracy can be a satisfactory solution for avoiding a repetition of the fascist holocaust. Examination of the prospects for democracy in Germany after the war gives direction to his inquiry.

The German past is made understandable by application of the concept of "retarded democracy." It explains why Germany as a nation never succeeded in breaking the power of her medieval landed aristocracy, her powerful industrialists and her military clique. It explains the failure of the liberal movement in the first half of the last century, and of the labor movement, which inherited the liberal

tradition. The immediate future is envisaged in the concept of "dependent revolution" which carefully circumscribes Germany's revolutionary potential. Hagen has no illusions about the obstacles in the way of a democratic revolution in post-Hitler Germany. There is the factor of foreign intervention, which may or may not retard the cleaning-up process in Germany's antiquated social structure. There is the shortage of democratic leadership which will temporarily hold up the early crystallization of democratic organizations. But the "dependent revolution" has a good chance of success because the collapse of the Nazi regime will produce genuine revolutionary situations.

Hagen does not plead for a soft peace. He does not whitewash Germany. He attacks Vansittartism and, in my opinion, successfully refutes it, not because he wants Germany to get away with an easy peace, but because he wants a real peace. Hagen is a liberal, a democrat and a socialist. He wants for Germany a system of democratic planning, as against a restoration of profit capitalism. He is keenly aware of the fact that those who advance the thesis of Vansittartism are essentially reactionary. Because they themselves are part of those forces which make for fascism, they try to hide their social bias by making the entire German people responsible for the Hitler nightmare. They are eager to divert attention from the real fascist-makers in Germany because the destruction of capitalism, big landholding and reaction, and the introduction of socialism and revolutionary democracy, are counter to their own interests. The greatest merit of Hagen's book is that it invalidates the question of "what to do with Germany," which presupposes a passive mass to whom we can "do things."

That Hagen's thesis is not just a house of cards is amply demonstrated by Gerschenkron's scholarly and fascinating account of Germany's agricultural system. While Hagen is principally interested in the labor movement as the backbone of a democratic Germany, Gerschenkron discusses the problem of German agriculture in its relation to democratic reconstruction. Like Hagen, Gerschenkron believes that democracy is possible in Germany if a reliable democratic majority can be achieved by an alliance between industrial labor and the peasantry. The past record of the latter group does not justify such optimism. But Gerschenkron demonstrates that the anti-democratic past of the German peasantry was primarily due to the feudal leadership of German agriculture rather than to any innate anti-democratic feeling on the part of the peasants. The liquidation of the Junker class is an essential step in the direction of guaranteeing democratic stability in Germany.

Fredborg's experiences in Germany between 1941 and 1943 are not directly related to the question of postwar Germany, but they throw many interesting sidelights on the question of "who is to blame" for Nazi atrocities. Fredborg is a rather stuffy Swedish newspaperman whose social bias is in the direction of Vansittart rather than Hagen. And while I was disappointed in not finding out more from Mr. Fredborg on what is going on behind the steel wall, I was happy to find that the Germans, on the whole, are human beings after all. The funniest part of the book is Fredborg's report of the Austrian dislike of all things Prussian. Almost equally amusing is his account of the rivalries between the Foreign Office and the Propa-

FOR Spring

WALTER CLARK FIGHTING JUDGE

By Aubrey Lee Brooks. The story of a great "dissenter" — for thirty-five years Chief Justice of North Carolina's Supreme Court — who fifty years ago advocated the eight-hour day, property rights for women, rule by legislatures and not by judges, and lashed out against the monopolies and child labor interests. February 26, \$3.00

JUSTICE AND WORLD SOCIETY

By Laurence Stapleton. How can Nazism be criticized and condemned if no universally valid idea of justice exists? How did this concept disappear from the social sciences? Why is its revival essential to the maintenance and further development of civilization? These important questions are asked and answered in this volume. April 4, \$2.00

THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE

By Ruhl J. Bartlett. The story of a powerful peace movement at the close of the first World War, of the organization that backed Wilson's plans, of how these plans were wrecked, and who did the wrecking. April 15, \$2.50

THE ROAD TO SALEM

By Adelaide L. Fries. The story of a Moravian community on the Carolina frontier is here told by an eye-witness, Catherina Ernst, in her "autobiography," which the author has supplemented from other Moravian records. \$4.00

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ganda Ministry. Rather dull are the major portions in which the author describes the various military campaigns of the German army as seen through the eyes of German propaganda, with somewhat obvious explanations of his own. But what stands out—and therein lies the merit of the book—is the deep gulf which separates the German people from the Nazi Party. When the collapse of the Nazi regime comes, this gulf may be the salvation of Germany.

HEINZ H. F. EULAU

Two New Thrillers

THE DELICATE APE, by Dorothy B. Hughes (Duell, Sloan and Pearce, \$2.50). It is twelve years after the war and the World Peace Conclave is meeting in New York City. Germany is about to put over her grand coup—cancellation of the fifty-year protectorate decreed for her by the peace treaty. Anstruther, American Secretary for Peace and president of the conclave, can expose the German plot, but he is missing. Can Piers Hunt, his aide, who knows the Germans have murdered Anstruther, thwart their plan? Mrs. Hughes's idea is better than her execution, but her originality is to be commended. Plenty of suspense and fast action, with some interesting sidelights on diplomacy—the delicate ape.

A SPY FOR MR. CROOK, by Anthony Gilbert (Smith and Durrell, \$2). The author of "Mystery in the Woodshed" and "Woman in Red" again deserts private crime for the international variety—sabotage in the RAF. Mr. Crook, at his brash best, is more than a match for the conspirators,

and he is ably assisted by Sarah Bennett, secretary to an M.P. and a dandy character. The lively if rather incredible goings-on are leavened by diverting candid-camera shots of Parliament behind the scenes. Good fun.

ELIZABETH HULING

Contributors

IRVING BRANT resigned as an editorial writer for The Chicago Sun last November in order to write the second volume of "James Madison: The Virginia Revolutionist." His most recent book is "Road to Peace and Freedom," published late last year by Bobbs-Merrill.

RICHARD T. FRANKENSTEIN, vice-president and aircraft director of the United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW-CIO), is responsible for directing the UAW-CIO's present political-action program.

MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS is a professor of Anthropology at Northwestern University. He has been a leader of expeditions to Dutch Guiana (1928-29), West Africa (1931), Haiti (1934) and Trinidad (1939). His particular interest has been in the results of physical and cultural contacts between peoples, with special reference to the Negroes of Africa and the New World.

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